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Problems in the Removal of
a "Separate and Independent

Claim or Cause of Action"
The procedural problems of the complex lawsuit have
long been a source of agitationfor the legal profession. In
this Article, Professor Cohen first discusses the difficulties
besetting both separable controversy removal and piecemeal controversy removal under the Judiciary Act of
1887-1888. The author then discusses the changes which
were made by the Revisers of the 1948 Judicial Code.
Professor Cohen analyzes the basic problems of interpretation and applicationposed by section 1441(c) in diversity and federal question cases. In addition, the author
examines the constitutional problems posed by section
1441(c). He concludes that section 1441(c) should be
repealed, not because of its doubtful constitutional validity, but rather because "it serves no useful purpose in
multi-party cases."

William Cohen*
As procedural rules for the joinder of parties and claims have
been liberalized, puzzling problems have been created in defining
the proper scope of federal jurisdiction. Procedural reformers have
urged the efficiency of the larger law suit.' But, the procedural
gospel has often been met by a competing theology-narrowly defining congressional grants of jurisdiction to federal courts, particularly grants of diversity jurisdiction.2 Itis little wonder that the
*Associate Professor of Law, University of California, Los Angeles.

1. This is a gospel which is no more clearly illustrated than in the liberal

joinder, intervention, and third party practice of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. See FED. R. Civ. P. 13, 14, 18, 20-24, 42. And see CLARK,
CODE PLEADING 348, 435, 465-66 (2d ed. 1947) [hereinafter cited as
CLARK].

2. See Frankfurter, Distributionof JudicialPower Between United States
and State Courts, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 499 (1928); Wechsler, FederalJurisdiction and the Revision of the Judicial Code, 13 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB.

216 (1948). Cf. Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667
(1950).
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answers to the jurisdictional problems created by the complex law
suit have often exhibited considerable inconsistency.3 Nor is it
surprising that procedural concepts of an earlier day often continue
to set jurisdictional limits after they have been discarded as tools
for solving the procedural problems for which they were created.
The push and pull of the competing pressures for procedural
reform in the complex lawsuit and narrow jurisdictional construction is nowhere more apparent than in the treatment of cases removed from state to federal courts-an area where the basic rule
itself has "quite anomalous implications."'
INTRODUCTION

A.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Until after the Civil War, under the Judiciary Act of 1789, only
civil cases within the original jurisdiction of federal trial courts
could be removed from state courts. 5 The Separable Controversy
Act of 1866 permitted a nonresident defendant to remove a portion of a "suit" by a resident plaintiff "if the suit is one in which
there can be a final determination of the controversy, so far as it
concerns him, without the presence of the other defendants as par3. See, e.g., Green, Jurisdiction of United States District Courts in
Multiple-Claim Cases, 7 VAD. L. REv. 472 (1954); Note, 64 HAv. L.
REv. 968 (1951).
4. Wechsler, supra note 2, at 233. As Professor Wechsler has pointed
out:
Though the plaintiff who puts forth the federal claim is content to seek
its vindication in the state tribunals, the defendant may insist upon an
initial federal forum. When, on the other hand, the plaintiff's reliance
is on state law and the defendant claims a federal defense, neither
party may remove-except, of course, the special case, to which attention has been called, of actions against federal officials. Nor is
there either original jurisdiction or removal where both the initial
claim and the defense rest on state law but the plaintiff contends
that the defense put forth is nullified by federal law.
It would, it seems to me, be far more logical to shape the rule precisely in reverse, granting removal to defendants when they claim a
federal defense against the plaintiff's state-created claim and to the
plaintiff when, as the issues have developed, he relies by way of replication on assertion of a federal right. The need is to remember that
the reason for providing the initial federal forum is the fear that state
courts will view the federal right ungenerously. That reason is quite
plainly absent in the only situation where, apart from federal officers,
removal now obtains: the case where the defendant may remove because the plaintiffs case is federal. If in any case the reason can be
present, it is only in the situations where removal is denied.
Id. at 233-34.
5. Judiciary Act of 1789, § 12, 1 Stat. 73.
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ties in the cause ..
."6 This piecemeal removal of only a portion of a lawsuit obviously necessitated multiple trials where a plaintiff proceeded against multiple defendants, and a diverse noncitizen procured removal of the suit only as it affected him.' To meet
this objection, section 2 of the Judiciary Act of 1875 provided
that:
when in any suit mentioned in this section there shall be a controversy
which is wholly between citizens of different States, and which can be
fully determined as between them, then either one or more of the
plaintiffs or defendants actually interested in such controversy may
remove said suit .... 8

The Judiciary Act of 1887-1888 eliminated the provision for removal by plaintiffs,9 but the provision for removal of separable
controversies continued unchanged until the 1948 revision of the
Judicial Code.
Despite its longevity, the separable controversy provision contained one glaring anomaly."0 While the statute was designed to
preclude the piecemeal litigation necessary under the 1866 Act,
the test for removability was carried over from that Act. Thus, the
test for removing the entire "suit" hinged upon the hypothetical
practicability of severing a "controversy" from the "suit" and trying it alone. And, as a subsequent judicial interpretation of
the statute was to make clear, piecemeal removal (and hence
piecemeal litigation) remained.
That interpretation, in essence, established three classes of controversies. Assuming that a suit was not within the original jurisdiction of a federal trial court, and the suit involved merely nonseparable controversies, removal was improper. And, of course,
under the statute a separable controversy involving parties of complete diversity provided basis for removal of the entire suit. But
finally, an additional category of controversy emerged-the separate controversy. A separate (as opposed to separable) controversy which could have been maintained, if brought alone, in an
6. 14 Stat. 306 (1866).

7. Texas Employers Ins. Ass'n v. Felt, 150 F.2d 227, 233 (5th Cir. 1945).

8. 18 Stat. 470 (1875).

9. 24 Stat. 552 (1887); 25 Stat. 433 (1888).
10. An additional difficulty is the language which refers the separable

controversy provision to "any suit mentioned in this section." 28 U.S.C.
§ 71 (1940) provided only for removal of cases within the district court's
original jurisdiction. If such a requirement were necessary for the application of § 71(c), then, of course, it could not serve as a vehicle for removing

a case unless there was complete diversity. One way to make § 71(c) more
than nominally significant was to ignore this language and permit removal
of partial diversity cases on the basis of separable controversy. See Barney
v. Latham, 103 U.S. 205 (1881).
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original federal court action did not provide basis for removal of
the entire case. The separate controversy with parties of complete
diversity was, however, treated as a "suit" which could be removed by itself." This tripartite division became enmeshed with the
cause of action concept. A separate controversy clearly involved
a separate cause of action.' 2 But it was not clear whether separable
controversies represented single or separate. "causes of action."' 3
The structure can be rationally explained. Where the controversies in a single lawsuit were very closely related, the policy of Congress inrestricting the right of removal to nonresident defendants,
and the policy implicit in Strawbridge v. Curtiss4 of limiting federal jurisdiction to cases of complete diversity, should combine to
leave the lawsuit in a state court. Where the controversies are less
related, joinder of non-removable with removable controversies
should not destroy the right of removal, yet the controversies are
sufficiently related to require a single trial in a single tribunal.
Where the controversies are extremely unrelated, single trial in a
single tribunal no longer is compelled even if removal of a removable separate controversy should not be defeated by joinder. 5
11. The doctrine was born in the following dictum in Barney v. Latham,
103 U.S.205, 214 (1881):
Itmay be suggested that, if the complaint has united causes of action,
which, under the settled rules of pleading, need not, or should not
have been united in one suit, the removal ought not to carry into the
Federal court any controversy except that which is wholly between
citizens of different states, leaving for the determination of the State
court, the controversy between the plaintiffs and the land company.
Removal of a separate controversy as a separate "suit" was directed in the
Pacific R.R. Removal Cases, 115 U.S. 1, 18-23 (1885). For a collection of
cases finding a "separate controversy" to exist, see Note, 52 COLUM. L.
REv.101, 102 n.4 (1952).
12. Pacific R.R. Removal Cases, 115 U.S. 1, 18-23 (1885); Barney v.
Latham, 103 U.S. 205, 214 (1881); Texas Employers Ins. Ass'n v. Felt,
150 F.2d 227, 230 (5th Cir. 1945); Young v. Southern Pac. Co., 15 F.2d
280 (2d Cir. 1926); Hammer v. British Type Investors, Inc., 15 F. Supp.
497 (S.D.N.Y.1933).
13. MOORE, COMMENTARY ON THE U. S. JUDICIAL CODE 244 (1949)

[hereinafter cited as MOORE] states that separable controversies involve a
single cause of action "using that term in a broad sense." The terminology

was always less than clear. Judge Holmes, in Texas Employers Ins. Ass'n v.
Felt, 150 F.2d 227, 230 (5th Cir. 1945), refers to separable controversies

as consisting of separate "causes of action" in a single "suit." Separate controversies are separate "suits." Ibid. This difficulty may explain why Judge
Holmes later determined that "separable controversies" might also constitute
"separate and independent claims or causes of action" within 28 U.S.C.

§ 1441(c) (1958). See note 44 infra. And see Pullman Co. v. Jenkins, 305
U.S. 534 (1939), discussed in Holmes, The Separable Controversy-A Federal Removal Concept, 12 Miss. L.J. 163 (1939); Note, 52 COLUM. L.
REv.101, 103 n.11 (1952).
14. 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806).
15. This accords with an explanation of "separable" controversy remov-

SECTION 1441(c)
It was pointed out, however, that theory did not solve the problems of drawing the lines in practice." Nearly three-quarters of a
century of interpretation could not give definitive meaning, for all
imaginable kinds of multi-party litigation, to pigeonholes based
upon related, less related and unrelated.17 Those distinctions which
were taken between separable and non-separable controversies
often could not be justified by pointing out that only in the
former would the joinder unfairly restrict a defendant's right to
remove. Primarily this was so because a controversy was not "separable" merely because it practically could have been tried as a
separate lawsuit. For example, if P sued D1 and D2 to impose
joint liability as joint tortfeasors, the two controversies were nonseparable and the entire suit remained in the state court.' On the
other hand, if P sued D1 and D2 on the theory that either Dl
or D2 was liable, in the alternative, for a single tortious injury,
the controversies were separable and the entire suit could be removed.' 9 Assuming in both cases that there has been no "fraudulent" joinder to avoid removal, it is difficult to formulate persuasive
policies which would justify allowing only one of these lawsuits to
be removed to a federal court.20 Similarly, the separate controal in terms of ancillary or pendent jurisdiction. Texas Employers Ins. Ass'n
v. Felt, 150 F.2d 227, 234 (5th Cir. 1945); HART & WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1045-46 (1953) [hereinafter cited
as HART & WECHSLER].
16. Note, 41 HARv. L. REv. 1048, 1051 (1928).
17. See Note, 94 U. PA. L. REv. 239 (1946); Note, 36 CoLuM. L. REV.
794 (1936).
18. Pullman Co. v. Jenkins, 305 U.S. 534, 538 (1939). The determination whether causes of action against joined defendants were "joint" or
"several" was a difficult one. In Pullman, the decedent was killed by a
blow from a passenger being ejected for disorderly conduct. The action
was in two counts: the first against the Southern Pacific Company, the Pullman Company, the ejected passenger, the Pullman conductor, the Pullman
porter and the Southern Pacific gate tender; the second against the passenger alone. While the court held that no separable controversy existed as between the actions against the Pullman Company and the porter, the court's
dicta indicated there was a separable controversy with respect to the action
against the passenger. Id. at 539. The impact of state law in determining
whether joined causes were "joint" or "several" was also uncertain. Mr.
Justice Black, concurring, went so far as to urge that causes of action
properly joined under state practice could not be separable. Id. at 542.
For a criticism of the Court's opinion, see Holmes, supra note 13. For a
critique of Mr. Justice Black's opinion, see HART & WECHSLER 1047. In
tort cases, some of the confusion stemmed from the different meanings
accorded to the term "joint tortfeasor." See 1 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS
692 (1956); PROSSER, TORTS 233-34 (2d ed. 1955).
19. Texas Employers Ins. Ass'n v. Felt, 150 F.2d 227 (5th Cir. 1945).
20. It may be argued that when the parties to the suit are "necessary,"
plaintiff could not have proceeded solely against the diverse parties in a
federal court. But it is only where an "indispensable" party is of nondiverse citizenship that diversity jurisdiction is defeated. See Note, 65 HARv.
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versy in practice often failed to match theoretical justifications for
its existence. The label "separate" had been applied to controversies which would most conveniently have been tried with the lawsuit from which they were separated.21 More important, the criteria for distinguishing the separate and separable controversy were
even less satisfactory than those for distinguishing the separable
and non-separable controversy. 2

B.

SECTION

1441(c): TiE DEMISE OF THE SEPARABLE CON-

TROVERSY

The difficulties besetting both separable controversy removal and
piecemeal separate controversy removal were attacked by the 1948
revision of the Judicial Code which provides in part:
(c) Whenever a separate and independent claim or cause of action,
which would be removable if sued upon alone, is joined with one or
more otherwise non-removable claims or causes of action, the entire
case may be removed and the district court may determine all issues
therein, or, in its discretion,2 may remand all matters not otherwise

within its original jurisdiction. 3

The Reviser's Note2" can be read to indicate a simple and unsophisticated change. Removal on the basis of separable controversy
was abolished. The former separate controversy removal was expanded to provide for removal of the entire litigation, not just a
fragment, 5 on the basis of a "separate and independent claim or
cause of action." Coupled with separate controversy removal is a
discretion to remand portions of the lawsuit beyond the separate
controversy.
On its face, this change would seem to alleviate the above-discussed problems in administration of the pre-1948 law. The disL. REv. 1050 (1952). And, under modern procedure, there is generally no
objection to separate lawsuits against "joint" tortfeasors. 1 HARPER & JAMEs,
op. cit. supra note 18, at 709. However, suits against joint tortfeasors were
not separable. See note 17 supra.
21. This was particularly true in multiple-plaintiff cases. E.g., Young v.
Southern Pac. Co., 15 F.2d 280 (2d Cir. 1926); Idaho v. American Sur.
Co., 218 Fed. 678 (D. Idaho 1914); Hammer v. British Type Investors, Inc.,

15 F. Supp. 497 (S.D.N.Y. 1933).

22. Note, 52 COLUM. L. REV. 101, 103 n.6 (1952); Note, 36 COLUM.
L. REv. 794, 800 (1936).
23. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) (1958).
24. Reviser's Note, 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1958) [hereinafter cited as Reviser's Note].

25. MooRE 237-53 so interprets the impact of § 1441(c). That the test
for removal under § 1441(c) can be found in the old "separate controversy" cases is reiterated in Moore & Van Dercreek, Multi-Party, Multi-Claim
Removal Problems: The Separate and Independent Claim Under Section
1441(c), 46 IowA L. Rlv. 489, 492 (1961).
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tinctions previously utilized to delineate between the single cause
of action which was separable and that which was not have been
put aside. In the examples given above, removal does not depend
on whether the plaintiff's claims against defendants in a tort suit
are "joint" or "several."26 Nor, in any case, is there necessity to
fragmentize litigation that can best be handled in a single court,
since no basis is recognized for removal of less than an entire
"case."2 7 All this, of course, is to the good.
But section 1441 (c) contained some subtle problems of its own.
As previously mentioned, the separable controversy statute was
anomalous in basing removability of the entire lawsuit upon the
hypothetical practicability of severing a portion for separate trial.28
Section 1441(c), by shifting emphasis to the "separate and independent claim or cause of action," emphasizes that it is the lack of
connection between removable and non-removable claims that
forms the basis for asserting federal jurisdiction over both. It may
be conceded that awkward piecemeal trials are avoided in any
event: if the lack of connection is not sufficient, the litigation remains wholly in the state court; if the lack of connection is sufficiently demonstrated, the entire litigation is removed to the federal
court. And, such complete lack of connection as would demonstrate
the lack of necessity for a single proceeding to try the removable
and non-removable claims, need not result in federal trial of all
claims. While the district court's discretion to remand "matters
not otherwise within its original jurisdiction" is not defined or
given guidance by the language of section 1441 (c), it is not difficult to envisage that the discretion will be exercised where separate
trials of the removable and non-removable claims would be appropriate.29 Conceding all this, section 1441 (c) takes the unique ap26. See note 17 supra.
27. See text accompanying note 20 supra. The pre-1948 removal statute
provided for removal of an entire "suit" if a separable "controversy" ex-

isted within that "suit." Piecemeal litigation resulted when a "suit" was defined to encompass each of the "separate controversies" within a single
litigation. See note 12 supra. In providing for removal of the entire "case,"
rather than a "suit," § 1441(c) was clearly designed to require removal,
when allowed, to consist of the entire litigation.
28. See text following note 9 supra.
29. See, e.g., Baltimore Gas & Electric Co. v. United States Fid. & Guar.

Co., 159 F. Supp. 738, 740-41 (D. Md. 1958); McFadden v. Grace Line,
Inc., 82 F. Supp. 494 (S.D.N.Y. 1948). Cf. Chemical Corn Exch. Bank v.

Hause, 159 F. Supp. 148 (S.D.N.Y. 1958); Rafferty v. Frock, 135 F.
Supp. 292 (D. Md. 1955). Lewin, The Federal Courts' Hospitable Back
Door-Removal of "Separate and Independent" Non-FederalCauses of Action, 66 HARv. L. REV. 423, 442 n.48 (1953) seems to intimate that the district court's discretion to remand or keep the non-removable portion is totally unguided. For discussion of whether constitutional problems surround
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proach of authorizing federal jurisdiction of an entire complex litigation not within original federal jurisdiction only where the connection between parts of the litigation is most tenuous.30
Despite the anomaly, section 1441 (c), like the previous removal
structure, 3' can be rationalized. Avoiding piecemeal litigation is
the theme.32 True, this could be most simply accomplished by restricting the right of removal to litigation which could have been
maintained whole in a federal court.33 While normally only such
cases can be removed, in those cases where plaintiff or plaintiffs
have joined claims which are sufficiently disconnected, section 1441
(c) retains a portion of the policy implicit in the prior law34 of not
permitting that joinder to destroy the right to remove which would
have existed absent joinder. While the entire litigation may be removed under section 1441 (c), only those claims which can be
tried together conveniently need be retained.
But on the face of the statute, it might be questioned whether
theory would find fruition in practice. Section 1441 (c) avoids the
tripartite division into non-separable, separable and separate controversies necessitated by prior law. Still a bipartite division must be
made between those claims which are "separate and independent"
and those which are not. The division is expressed partly in terms
of determining whether claims state separate "causes of action." It
no longer requires demonstration that distinctions between separate
causes of action and single causes of action are slippery.35 And,
it is open to question whether the old separate controversy cases
can be reliable guides under section 1441 (c). Section 1441 (c) requires that the causes of action be "separate and independent"the district court's decision to remand or keep the "matters not otherwise
within its original jurisdiction," see note 92 infra and accompanying text.
30. The following is offered as a paraphrase of § 1441(c) in HART &
WECHSLER 1046:

When a matter which would be independently within federal jurisdiction is associated in a state court proceeding with matters which would
not be independently within federal jurisdiction, the whole proceeding
can be removed to the federal court if the state and federal matters
are sufficiently disconnected.
31. See text accompanying notes 13-14 supra.
32. MooRE 250-51; Moore & Van Dercreek, supra note 25, at 497-98.
33. Lewin, supra note 29, at 430.

34. See text accompanying note 14 supra.
35. CLARK 127-48. If the definition which Clark espouses for defining

the permissible scope of joinder of causes is adopted, then the motion to

remand the "matters not otherwise within [the district court's] jurisdiction" would be nearly automatic once separate causes of action were found.
Certainly if the boundaries are "set pragmatically with a considerable eye

to trial convenience" separate causes of action exist only where the considerations which would justify remand of the remainder are present. Id. at
142. (Emphasis in original.)
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emphasizing the possibility that claims found to present distinct
causes of action nonetheless may not b-- sufficiently "separate and
independent." The term "cause of action" may be given a broader
construction than it was given in finding a separate controversy
to exist under the pre-1948 law. It has been suggested that, prior
to 1948, courts were tempted to find controversies "separate" rather than "severable" to avoid the necessity of removing an entire
lawsuit with numerous parties because of the existence of diversity
between a relatively small number of the parties.36 In light of the
statement in the Reviser's Note that section 1441 (c) will "somewhat decrease the volume of Federal litigation,"3 it is questionable whether such decisions offer firm guidance under a statute
where a finding of separateness operates to remove the entire litigation. Indeed, in difficult cases a court sensitive to increases in
federal jurisdiction would strain to find that controversies are not
separate.
Moreover, the pre-1948 cases defining separate controversies
do not present a cogent body of decisions, even if reliance upon
them were to be more clearly indicated.3" Thus, if the pre-1948
cases are to be the guide for application of section 1441 (c), it is
difficult to understand the Revisers' statement that the difficult distinctions between separate and separable controversy had been "illusory in substance."3 9 If "separate and independent claim or cause
of action" is to be read as incorporating the pre-1948 separate controversy, then this is exactly the distinction which is perpetuated
by section 1441 (c). Obviously if the line marking the beginning
of section 1441(c) is to be drawn at the precise point the line
marking the separate controversy was drawn prior to 1948, the illusory line continues to exist at that point and to create as many
problems in an attempt to plot its course.
36. Note, 52 COLuM. L. REv. 101, 102 (1952).
37. Reviser's Note.
38. Note, 52 COLUM. L. REV. 103 n.6 (1952); Note, 41 HAIv. L. REv.
1048, 1051 (1928).

39.
Subsection (c) has been substituted for the provision in section 71 of
title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., 'and when in any suit mentioned in this section, there shall be a controversy which is wholly between citizens of

different States, and which can be fully determined as between them,
then either one or more of the defendants actually interested in such
controversy may remove said suit into the district court of the United
States.'
This quoted language has occasioned much confusion. The courts

have attempted to distinguish between separate and separable contro-

versies, a distinction which is sound in theory but illusory in substance.
(See 41 Harv. L. Rev. 1048; 35 111. L. Rev. 576).
Revisers Note.
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Section 1441 (c), unlike the separable controversy statute, applies to all separate controversies which "would be removable if
sued upon alone." Its impact thus extends beyond diversity litigation. In federal question cases, puzzling problems of construction
may arise in attempting to reconcile the section 1441 (c) separate
controversy-asserting jurisdiction on removal over unrelated state
claims-and the pendent jurisdiction theory of Hurn v. Oursler4 °
-asserting original federal jurisdiction over more or less related
state claims.
Finally, section 1441 (c)presents numerous constitutional problems. Because section 1441 (c)stresses the lack of relationship between joined causes as the basis for asserting jurisdiction over the
entire litigation, one of the most often asserted bases for upholding
the separable controversy statute-pendent jurisdiction-is less
clearly applicable. It is the purpose of this article to examine these
constitutional problems, as well as the basic problems of interpretation and application posed by section 1441 (c) in both diversity
and federal question cases.
II.

SECTION 1441(c) IN DIVERSITY CASES

A. THE FINN CASE
As might be suspected, initial lower court decisions construing
section 1441(c) exhibited great diversity of opinion as to the
meaning of the crucial term "separate and independent claim or
cause of action."41 It required a Supreme Court decision to cast
some definitive light upon its meaning.
40. 289 U.S. 238 (1933).
41. Compare the opinions of Judges Hastie, Goodrich, and McLaughlin in Mayflower Indus. v. Thor Corp., 184 F.2d 537 (3d Cir. 1950). Cf.
Snow v. Powell, 189 F.2d 172 (10th Cir. 1951); Willoughby v. Sinclair
Oil & Gas Co., 188 F.2d 902 (10th Cir. 1951); Edwards v. E. I. Du Pont
De Nemours & Co., 183 F.2d 165 (5th Cir. 1950); Victory Cabinet Co.
v. Insurance Co. of No. America, 183 F.2d 360 (7th Cir. 1950); Bentley

v. Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co., 174 F.2d 788 (5th Cir. 1949).
Prior to 1952, the following district court decisions permitted removal under § 1441(c): Commander-Larabee Milling Co. v. Jones-Hettelsater Construction Co., 88 F. Supp. 476 (W.D. Mo. 1950) (liability in alternative);
McFadden v. Grace Line, Inc., 82 F. Supp. 494 (S.D.N.Y. 1948) (multipleplaintiffs); President & Directors of Manhattan Co. v. Monogram Associates, Inc., 81 F. Supp. 739 (E.D.N.Y. 1949) (third-party defendant); Buck-

holt v. Dow Chemical Co., 81 F. Supp. 463 (S.D. Tex. 1948) (joint tort);
Bentley v. Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co., 81 F. Supp. 323 (S.D. Tex.
1948) (joint tort). In the same period, numerous cases denied removal, and
many employed reasoning which would have been appropriate under the
former statute to deny removal. Sequoyah Feed & Supply Co. v. Robinson,
101 F. Supp. 680 (W.D. Ark. 1951) (cross-complaint); Silverman v. Swift
& Co., 100 F. Supp. 961 (D. Conn. 1951) (joint tort); Cudney v. Mid-
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Florence Finn, a Texas citizen, brought suit in a Texas state
court to recover on a fire policy issued by American Fire & Casualty

Co., a nonresident corporation. If American was not liable, she
sought recovery in the alternative against Indiana Lumbermens In-

surance Co., also a nonresident corporation. As a third alternative
claim, she sought recovery from Joe Reiss, resident agent of both
companies, for failure to procure insurance. As part of the last

claim, she further alleged that Reiss' conduct also bound both companies. Both companies procured removal. Plaintiff's motion to
remand was denied. After trial, judgment was given for Florence

Finn against American Fire & Casualty Co. After its loss at the
trial, American decided it had made a mistake in urging removal,
and moved to vacate the judgment and remand to the state court.
The district court denied the motion. Judge Edwin R. Holmes,
no stranger to the problems of separate and separable controversies," wrote the decision, affirming, for the United States Court of

Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.43 The portion of his opinion addressed to the issue whether plaintiff had stated "separate and independent" claims against the three defendants is short and succinct:
The difference, if any, between separable controversies under the old
statute and separate and independent claims under the new one is in
degree, not in kind. It is difficult to distinguish between the two concepts, but it is not necessary to attempt it in a case like this, which
would be removable under either statute. Under both, the removal
jurisdiction of the federal court is broader than its original jurisdiction,
and all questions of joinder, non-joinder, mis-joinder, or multi-fariousness, are for the federal court to determine after removal. We think
that the court below correctly overruled appellant's motion to remand.
See Rule 20(a) of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure . . .44
continent Airlines, Inc., 98 F. Supp. 403 (E.D. Mo. 1951) (joint tort);
Jury-Rowe Co. of Lansing v. Local 580, Teamsters Union, 97 F. Supp.
633 (E.D. Mich. 1951) (conspiracy); Doran v. Elgin Co-op. Credit Ass'n,
95 F. Supp. 455 (D. Neb. 1950) (surety defendant); Sansom v. New Amsterdam Ins. Co., 95 F. Supp. 6 (N.D. Ala. 1951) (defendants insured and
insurer); Rodewald v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 91 F. Supp. 700 (S.D. Iowa
1950) (joint tort); Willoughby v. Sinclair Oil & Gas Co., 89 F. Supp. 994
(W.D. Okla. 1950) (joint tort); Duffy v. Duffy, 89 F. Supp. 745 (S.D. Iowa
1950 (joint tort); Harward v. General Motors Corp., 89 F. Supp. 170 (E.D.
N.C. 1950) (joint tort); Billups v. American Sur. Co., 87 F. Supp. 894 (D.
Kan. 1950) (joint tort); Board of Directors of Crawford County Levee Dist.
v. Whiteside, 87 F. Supp. 69 (W.D. Ark. 1949) (condemnation against titleholder and mortgagee); Robinson v. Missouri Pac. Transp. Co., 85 F. Supp.
235 (W.D. Ark. 1949) (conspiracy); English v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R.,
80 F. Supp. 681 (E.D.S.C. 1948) (joint tort); Thomas v. Thompson, 80 F.
Supp. 225 (E.D. Ark. 1948) (joint tort).
42. See Texas Employers Ins. Ass'n v. Felt, 150 F.2d 227 (5th Cir.
1945); Holmes, supra note 13.
43. American Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn, 181 F.2d 845 (5th Cir. 1950).
44. Id. at 846.

12

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:1

The Supreme Court reversed in an opinion by Mr. Justice Reed.45
The Court emphasized the "congressional intention" to abridge the
right of removal by requiring "more complete disassociation" between joined claims,4 6 and that the separable controversy no longer provided a basis for removal.47 Turning, then, to the definition
of the term "cause of action" as used in section 1441 (c), the Court
stated that the term should be given an "accepted meaning" consonant with the congressional "purpose of limiting and simplifying
removal." ' Mr. Justice Reed's opinion, quoting a passage from
Baltimore S.S. Co. v. Phillips,4 9 then proceeded to define that
"accepted meaning":
A cause of action does not consist of facts, but of the unlawful violation of a right which the facts show. Thus, we conclude that where
there is a single wrong to plaintiff, for which relief is sought, arising
from an interlocked series of transactions, there is no separate and independent claim or cause of action under § 1441(c).50

Turning to the case at hand, there was no right to removal.
The past history of removal of "separable" controversies, the effort
of Congress to create a surer test, and the intention of Congress to restrict the right of removal 5 ' leads us to the conclusion that separate
and independent causes of action are not stated. The facts in each portion of the complaint involve Reiss, the damage comes from a single
incident. The allegations in which Reiss is a defendant involve substantially the same facts and transactions as do the allegations in the
first portion of the complaint against the foreign insurance compaare separate and independent claims
nies. It cannot be said that there
52
for relief as § 1441(c) requires.
45. American Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6 (1951).
46. Id. at 12.
47. "[U]nless it also constitutes a separate and independent claim or
cause of action." Id. at 11. If a separable controversy can also be a "separate and independent claim or cause of action," more doubt is cast on the
proposition that § 1441(c) merely incorporates the pre-1948 "separate controversy" as a standard. See text at notes 36-39 supra. A similar statement
is found in the Reviser's Note. "Subsection (c) permits the removal of a separate cause of action but not of a separable controversy unless it constitutes a separate and independent claim or cause of action

....

"

(Em-

phasis added.) Reviser's Note. Cf. MooRE 238.
48. 341 U.S. at 12.
49. 274 U.S 316, 321 (1927).
50. 341 U.S. at 14. At this point, the court cited CLARK 137 for "a discussion of cause of action in code pleading."
51. That "intention" is made less than clear in the Reviser's Note. It is,
at least, difficult to find from the Reviser's statement that the new test
"will somewhat decrease the volume of Federal litigation." That this was a
statement of a purpose to narrow removal rather than of a collateral consequence of a "surer test" was first suggested by MOORE 239.

52. 341 U.S. at 16.
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AFTER FINN

The Finn case may have resulted in a "surer test"--at least a
surer result-in one large group of cases. Since this group was
easily the largest numerically, and had presented the most troublesome problems under the old separable controversy statute, this
may be counted as a reduction in the problems of diversity juris-

diction

3

and as a major gain in simplicity at least. In multiple-

defendant cases where plaintiff is seeking money damages, and
where the payment of a judgment against one defendant will
be credited to other defendants in full, the claims against that defendant are not "separate and independent" from those against the
other defendants.5 4 Thus, in cases like Finn, the difficulty of
53. Thus, § 1441(c) in operation does bear out the statement in the Reviser's Note, supra note 51. Some of these cases would have been removable under the pre-1948 law. See text accompanying notes 18-19 supra.
54. The following cases, since Finn, purport to permit removal or state
that removal would be appropriate under § 1441(c): Hartford Acc. &
Indem. Co. v. Shaw, 273 F.2d 133 (8th Cir. 1959) (action for declaration
of insurance coverage separate and independent from action for cancellation of truck leasing agreement); Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Standolind Oil & Gas Co., 251 F.2d 412 (8th Cir. 1958) (quiet title action against
defendants with diverse claims of title); Greenshields v. Warren Petroleum
Corp., 248 F.2d 61 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 907 (1957) (suit by
royalty owner against oil and gas lessees and gas plant operators; removing defendants obligation covers less extensive gas zone than remaining defendants and is alleged to result from subsequent and different acts); Division of Labor Law Enforcement v. Stanley Restaurants, 228 F.2d 420 (9th
Cir. 1955) (determination of relative priority of assignee's expenses and
state statutory labor liens separate and independent from determination of
federal government's priority to those liens); Vogel v. Northern Assur.
Co., 219 F.2d 409 (3d Cir. 1955) (buyer allowed to collect on both seller's
and buyer's insurance for real estate fire loss although recovery exceeded
loss; neither insurer is entitled to credit for recovery against the other; claims
against two companies are separate and independent); Komlos v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 209 F.2d 436 (2d Cir. 1953) (single plaintiff
and single defendant; $1,500 loss-of-baggage claim held separate and independent from $150,000 wrongful death claim); Yuba Consol. Gold Fields
v. Kilkeary, 206 F.2d 884, 890 n.10 (9th Cir. 1953) (multiple plaintiffs);
Shelley v. The Maccabees, 180 F. Supp. 517 (E.D.N.Y. 1959) (claim for
inducing breach of contract separate and independent from claim for
breach; court notes plaintiff is entitled to recover damages for inducement
beyond compensatory damages for breach); Swift & Co. v. United Packinghouse Workers, 177 F. Supp. 511 (D. Colo. 1959) (federal question case;
plaintiffs claims are either separate and independent under § 1441(c) or
pendent to federal claims justifying removal under § 1441(a)); Breslerman v. American Liberty Ins. Co., 169 F. Supp. 531 (E.D.N.Y. 1959) (defendant insurers liable on six policies covering different buildings destroyed in single fire); Tsavdaridis v. T. J. Stevenson & Co., 165 F. Supp. 174
(S.D.N.Y. 1958) (single alien plaintiff v. single domestic corporate defendant; alternative ground--claims are either pendent or separate and independent); Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 159
F. Supp. 738 (D. Md. 1958) (insurance policies covering pro-rata propor-
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making distinctions between joint and several claims, and between
necessary and merely proper parties, required by the former law,
no longer exists.55 Going beyond these cases, however, the test
suggested by the Court and the results in subsequent cases are

more uncertain. In fact, the opinion in Finn contains enough "all-

things-to-all-men" language in defining a cause of action to create
debate, at least, in the following types of multiple-party cases: multiple-defendant cases where payment of a judgment against one detion of a single loss); Chemical Corn Exch. Bank v. Hause, 159 F. Supp.
148 (S.D.N.Y. 1948) (third-party defendant); Alabama Vermiculite Corp. v.
Patterson, 149 F. Supp. 534 (W.D.S.C. 1955) (alternative ground; claim
against lessee and its agents for negligent conduct of mining operations is
separate and independent from claim against lessee for waste); Harris v.
Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y of the United States, 147 F. Supp. 478 (S.D.
Iowa 1957) (suit for breach of contract against insurer, and against insurer
and another defendant for conspiracy to bring about breach of contract);
Rafferty v. Frock, 135 F. Supp. 292 (D. Md. 1955) (removal by thirdparty defendant); Epstein v. The Commercial Travelers Mut. Ace. Ass'n
of America, 124 F. Supp. 198 (E.D.N.Y. 1954) (claim against two insurance companies under two policies); McMahon v. City of Troy, 122 F.
Supp. 555 (N.D.N.Y. 1954) (third-party defendant); Emery v. Chicago B.
& Q.R.R., 119 F. Supp. 654 (S.D. Iowa 1954) (claims for fraud in inducing plaintiff to dismiss earlier FELA action and for breach of oral contract
to "take care" of plaintiff separate and independent from non-removable
FELA action); Industrial Lithographic Co. v. Mendelsohn, 119 F. Supp.
284 (D.N.J. 1954) (third-party defendant); Bonner v. Smith, 114 F. Supp.
895 (E.D. Okla. 1953) (claims against defendants with separate claims to
property in quiet title action are separate and independent); Allison v.
American Airlines, 112 F. Supp. 37 (N.D. Okla. 1953) (claim for inducing
breach of contract separate and independent from claim for breach); Leppard v. Jordan's Truck Line, 110 F. Supp. 811 (E.D.S.C. 1953) (claim
against tortfeasor's liability insurer separate and independent from claim
against tortfeasor); Reynolds v. Bryant, 107 F. Supp. 704 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
(multiple plaintiffs); Kornegay v. Hardware Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 106 F.
Supp. 347 (E.D.N.C. 1952) (insurance policies covering pro-rata proportion of a single loss); Scheilder v. Jones, 105 F. Supp. 726 (S.D.N.Y. 1952)
(multiple plaintiffs); Citizen's Nat'l Trust & Say. Bank v. Munson Equip.
Co., 24 F.R.D. 193 (S.D. Cal. 1959) (cross-claim).
Of the above-cited cases, only two involve situations where the plaintiff
clearly would be entitled to only a single satisfaction. In Alabama Vermiculite Corp. v. Patterson, 149 F. Supp. 534 (W.D.S.C. 1955), § 1441(c)
was only an alternative ground for removal since the court supported removal also on the ground of fraudulent joinder of the non diverse parties.
In Leppard v. Jordan's Truck Line, 110 F. Supp. 811 (E.D.S.C. 1953), the
court found that the actions were separate primarily because state law pro.
hibited joinder. In 67 HARv. L. REv. 519 (1954) the case is severely criticized on grounds that there was but a single wrong, that it is inconsistent
to base removal on joinder of misjoined parties, and that under North
Carolina law the plaintiff has no action against the insurer until judgment
has been obtained against the insured. Emery v. Chicago B. & Q.R.R., 119
F. Supp. 654 (S.D. Iowa 1954), may also fall into this category since the
plaintiffs claims seem to be in the alternative; the court reasoned that the
non-FELA claims were separate and independent since they resulted from
events occurring subsequent to the personal injury.
55. See note 18 supra.
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fendant need not be credited in full to other defendants;5 multiple-defendant cases where plaintiff is seedng relief other than money damages;"7 multiple-plaintiff cases;5" and cases where contro56. Of the 27 reported cases permitting removal under § 1441(c) since
Finn the following 9 cases fit or may fit in this category: Greenshields v.
Warren Petroleum Corp., 248 F.2d 61 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S.
907 (1957); Vogel v. Northern Assur. Co., 219 F.2d 409 (3d Cir. 1955);
Shelley v. The Maccabees, 180 F. Supp. 517 (E.D.N.Y. 1959); Breslerman
v. American Liberty Ins. Co., 169 F. Supp. 531 (E.D.N.Y. 1959); Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 159 F. Supp.
738 (D. Md. 1958); Harris v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y of the United
States, 147 F. Supp. 478 (S.D. Iowa 1957); Allison v. American Airlines,
112 F. Supp. 37 (N.D. Okla. 1953); Kornegay v. Hardware Mut. Fire Ins.
Co., 106 F. Supp. 377 (E.D.N.C. 1952); Epstein v. The Commercial Travelers Mut. Ace. Ass'n of America, 124 F. Supp. 198 (E.D.N.Y. 1957).
Note, 65 HARv. L. REv. 107, 166-68 (1951) takes the position that separate
and independent claims are presented if plaintiff's recovery on one claim
would not preclude enforcement of the other. The insurance cases make
this less than clear. See notes 69-70 infra and accompanying text. Compare
Knight v. Chrysler Corp., 134 F. Supp. 593 (D.N.J. 1955) (claims for
breach of contract and inducing breach of contract not separate and independent) with Shelley v. The Maccabees, 180 F. Supp. 517 (E.D.N.Y.
1959); Harris v. Equitable Life Ass'n Soc'y of America, 147 F. Supp. 478
(S.D. Iowa 1957); Allison v. American Airlines, 112 F. Supp. 37 (N.D.
Okla. 1953); cf. Mayflower Industries v. Thor Corp., 184 F.2d 537 (3d
Cir. 1950).
Further, the Supreme Court in Finn stated that Barney v. Latham, 103
U.S. 205 (1881), would no longer be removable, 341 U.S. at 12 n.5. But
in that case plaintiff's claims were neither alternative nor overlapping.
HART & WECHSLER 1047. Cf. Meade v. Weddington, 145 F. Supp. 183
(E.D. Ky. 1956) (libel claim against defendants who made statements and
against newspaper which published them not separate and independent;
"test" is whether there could be a verdict in favor of the individual defendants and against the newspaper).
57. Of the 27 reported cases permitting removal under § 1441(c) since
Finn, the following 3 cases fit in this category: Hartford Ace. & Indem.
Co. v. Shaw, 273 F.2d 133 (8th Cir. 1959); Evangelical Lutheran Church
v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 251 F.2d 412 (8th Cir. 1958); Division of Labor
Law Enforcement v. Stanley Restaurants, 228 F.2d 420 (9th Cir. 1955)
(semble). Cf. Santa Margarita Mut. Water Co. v. State Water Rights Bd.,
165 F. Supp. 870 (S.D. Cal. 1958) (claims of adverse water rights claimants in state court mandamus proceeding not separate and independent); In
re Green River Drainage Area, 147 F. Supp. 127 (D. Utah 1956) (claims
of adverse water rights claimants in suit for determination of water rights
not separate and independent); State v. American Mach. & Foundry Co.,
143 F. Supp. 703 (D. Colo. 1956) (action to condemn land presents no
separate and independent claim even if defendants own separate interests).
58. Of the 27 reported cases permitting removal under § 1441(c) since
Finn the following 4 cases fit in this category: Komlos v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 209 F.2d 436 (2d Cir. 1953) (plaintiff suing in two
capacities); Yuba Consol. Gold Fields v. Kilkearky, 206 F.2d 884 (9th Cir.
1953); Reynolds v. Bryant, 107 F. Supp. 704 (S.D.N.Y. 1952); and Scheildeler v. Jones, 105 F. Supp. 726 (S.D.N.Y. 1952). Cf. Rosen v. Rozan, 179
F. Supp. 829 (D. Mont. 1959) (claims of plaintiffs, tenants in common,
to quiet title, arise out of common source and hence are not separate and
independent). It is, at least anomalous to hold that claims of joined plain-
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versies are introduced by counterclaim, cross-claim, third-party
claim, intervention or garnishment. 59
The Court's opinion seems to take both sides of the McCaskillClark debate on the definition of a cause of action.6" First, comes
the admission that "cause of action is a term with many meanings."'" Then, after concluding
that the term should be given an
"accepted meaning,"'6 McCaskill is given a clear endorsement
with the quotation from Baltimore S.S. Co. v. Phillips63 that "a
cause of action does not consist of facts, but of the unlawful violation of a right which the facts show."6 Next, as the "wrong" is
tiffs are separate and independent so long as they are not "joint." First,
this keeps alive the distinction between "joint" and "several" claims which
plagued the pre-1948 law (see note 18 supra) and which has been done
away with by § 1441 (c)in cases of claims against joined defendants. Moreover, it is difficult to construct a significant policy which would permit removal where closely related claims are joined by several plaintiffs against
one defendant, yet deny removal where closely related claims are joined
by one plaintiff against several defendants. Note, 52 CoLum. L. REv. 101,
106-07 (1952). Cf. text accompanying note 69 infra.
59. Of the 27 reported cases permitting removal under § 1441(c) since
Finn, the following 5 cases fit in this category: Chemical Corn Exch. Bank
v. Hause, 159 F. Supp. 148 (S.D.N.Y. 1948); Rafferty v. Frock, 135 F.
Supp. 292 (D. Md. 1955); McMahon v. City of Troy, 122 F. Supp. 555
(N.D.N.Y. 1954); Industrial Lithographic Co. v. Mendelsohn, 119 F. Supp.
294 (D.N.J. 1954); Citizens Nat'l Trust & Say. Bank v. Munson Equip. Co.,
24 F.R.D. 193 (S.D. Cal. 1959). It has been forcefully argued that the
word "joined" in § 1441(c) is limited to claims joined by a plaintiff or plaintiffs, which would preclude removal in all such cases. Moore & Van Dercreek, supra note 25, at 509-12; Note, 51 MICH. L. REv. 115 (1952).
Many cases have denied removal on this ground or, in the case of thirdparty claims, that the claim does not come into being until plaintiff succeeds
in the action against the principal defendant. See, e.g., Harper v. Somahend, 182 F. Supp. 594 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) (third-party claim); Shaver v. Arkansas-Best Freight Syst., Inc., 171 F. Supp. 754 (W.D. Ark. 1959) (thirdparty claim); Lee Foods Div. v. Bucy, 105 F. Supp. 402 (W.D. Mo. 1952)
(counterclaim); Aetna Ins. Co. v. City of Malden, 102 F. Supp. 126 (E.D.
Mo. 1952) (cross-claim); Sequoyah Feed & Supply Co. v. Robinson, 101
F. Supp. 680 (W.D. Ark. 1951) (third-party claim).
60. For a resume of the numerous articles written during that debate,
by the participants and others, see CLARK 132 n.149, nn.177-79. Clark
summarizes Professor McCaskill's position as follows: "the cause of action
should be considered as limited by the right which is being enforced and
that the extent of such right should be determined by the precedents." Id.
at 132. Clark's own position is summarized as follows: "The cause of action must, therefore, be such an aggregate of operative facts as will give
rise to at least one right of action, but it is not limited to a single right
... .The extent of the cause is to be determined pragmatically by the
court, having in mind the facts and circumstances of the particular case."
For purposes of determining appropriate joinder, the controlling factor will
be "trial convenience." Id. at 137.
61. 341 U.S. at 12.
62. Ibid.

63. 274 U.S. 316, 321.
64. 341 U.S. at 13.
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defined to consist of the failure to pay for the loss of the property,
the entire case is brought within this definition of a cause of action.'R Now, however, the opinion becomes less clear. For, after
reviewing the facts,6 6 the Court reasons that there was but a single
wrong in this case because the facts supporting each claim "involve
substantially the same facts and transactions.
,,st
Round two
goes to Clark.6"
What guidance exists, then, for lower courts in applying Finn
beyond multiple-defendant cases where satisfaction of a judgment
against one defendant will satisfy the plaintiff's claim? The simplest example of the problem is in those multiple-defendant cases
where plaintiff is entitled to several judgments against several defendants. A recurring situation is this: A owns a building, covered
by two separate fire insurance policies issued by different companies. After a fire destroys the building, A sues both companies,
alleging that each is responsible for a pro-rata share of the loss.
One company is of common citizenship. From the Finn case, equally cogent arguments can be made to support or defeat removal by
the diverse company. The argument for removal is pitched, of
course, to the separate "rights" against the separate companies in
that plaintiff seeks "separate" judgments against them.69 The argument for remand emphasizes the policy of limiting federal juris7
diction and the close factual connection between the claims. 1
Divergence of results in the decided cases is not surprising.
65. Id. at 14.
66. Id. at 14-16.
67. Id. at 16.
68. For an argument that Mr. Justice Reed's opinion "swallowed the
Yale Law School party line" on the meaning of a cause of action, and that
there were three causes of action under the McCaskill theory, see Keeffe,
Thaler, Bernstein, Wright & Gillmer, Venue and Removal Jokers in the
New Federal Judicial Code, 38 VA. L. REv. 569, 605, 607 (1952). See also
Note, 46 ILL. L. R v. 335 (1951); Note, 49 MICH. L. REv. 1236 (1951);
Note, 100 U. PA. L. REV. 277 (1951); Note, 35 MINN. L. REV. 413
(1951); Note, 25 TUL. L. REv. 284 (1951).
69. Of the 27 reported cases since Finn which permit removal under
§ 1441(c), 3 cases permit removal in this situation: Baltimore Gas & Elec.
Co. v. United States Fid. & Cas. Co., 159 F. Supp. 738 (D. Md. 1958);
Epstein v. Commercial Travelers Acc. Ass'n, 124 F. Supp. 198 (E.D.N.Y.
1954) (semble); Kornegay v. Hardware Mut. Ins. Co., 106 F. Supp. 347
(E.D.N.C. 1952). Cf. Vogel v. Northern Assur. Co., 219 F.2d 409 (3d
Cir. 1955) (plaintiff recovered the full face amount of both policies); Breslerman v. American Liberty Ins. Co., 169 F. Supp. 531 (E.D.N.Y. 1959)
(defendant companies insured different properties destroyed in a single fire).
70. See, e.g., Hafif v. Caledonian-American Ins. Co., 127 F. Supp. 639
(S.D.N.Y. 1955); Harrisville Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 129 F. Supp. 300 (S.D.
N.Y. 1954); Compressed Paper Box Corp. v. Fidelity-Phenix Fire Ins. Co.,

124 F. Supp. 561 (D. Conn. 1954); South Carolina Elec. & Gas Co. v.
Aetna Ins. Co., 114 F. Supp. 79 (E.D.S.C. 1953); Board of Educ. v.
Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 105 F. Supp. 697 (D.N.J. 1952).
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Arguments emphasizing that, since several judgments may be
rendered, plaintiff has several "rights" and hence "separate and in-

dependent claims or causes of action" must eventually lose sight
of any sound policy to distinguish those cases which can be removed and those which must remain in state court. In tort cases,
for example, where defendants operate independently to the injury of plaintiff, whether all defendants are jointly liable for the
entire injury or liable severally for portions of the injury depends on
policies entirely remote from removal of multi-party cases. 71 It is
difficult, too, to assert that the definition of a "cause of action"
to determine removability under section 1441(c) should hinge
closely on state law damage concepts.72
On the other hand, carried to a logical extreme, arguments emphasizing factual similarity to defeat removal under section 1441
(c) could largely render that section nugatory in multi-party diver-

sity cases. This is especially true if the argument is accepted that
71. In Montrey v. Schweitzer, 105 F. Supp. 708 (D.N.J. 1952), plaintiffs sought recovery for river pollution by two corporate defendants. In
holding that the claims against the two defendants were not separate and
independent regardless of whether the complaint alleged concert of action
between the two defendants, the court noted that the complaint alleged
the impossibility of dividing damages and thus sought joint recovery. Id.
at 714-15. Whether damages will be apportioned as between tortfeasors
not acting in concert or plaintiff will be entitled to a joint judgment for the
full amount of his damages against each tortfeasor should depend only in
part upon the practical apportionability of damages. Various subtle factors, such as the availability or non-availability of contribution among joint
tortfeasors, may operate in weighing potential unfairness to plaintiff in receiving inadequate recovery and potential unfairness to defendants in paying a disproportionate share of the plaintiffs loss. See 2 HARPER & JAMES,
TORTS 1128-31 (1956); PROSSER, TORTS 226-29 (2d ed. 1955).

72. Further, if removal turns upon whether damage awards against defendants will be joint or several, the merits of the plaintiff's claim become
inextricably intertwined with the right to remove. For example, suppose the
position is taken that separate and independent claims are not presented
where the size of an award against one defendant depends upon the size of
recovery against another. See cases cited in note 70 supra. On the other
hand, it is conceded that separate and independent claims are presented if
the awards against each defendant are distinct. Breslerman v. American
Liberty Ins. Co., 169 F. Supp. 531 (E.D.N.Y. 1959); Moore & Van Dercreek, supra note 25, at 504. If both propositions are assumed true, then
removability in such cases as Vogel v. Northern Assur. Co., 219 F.2d 409
(3d Cir. 1955) turns on the merits. There the sole issue was whether the
buyer of real property could recover in full under both his and the seller's
fire insurance policies, although the total recovery would exceed the
loss. The court permitted removal, but also held that plaintiff could recover
in full under both policies. Would removal have been improper if the decision had been that plaintiff was only entitled to pro-rata recoveries against
the two defendants? Cf. Montrey v. Schweitzer, 105 F. Supp. 708, 715 (D.
N.J. 1952), where the court stated that doubts under state law as to apportionability of damages should be resolved in favor of leaving the case in
the state court rather than in favor of removal.

SECTION 1441(c)
section 1441 (c) applies only to claims joined by a plaintiff or
plaintiffs. 73 The most liberal provisions for joinder of parties require a common question of law or fact and that the claims arise
out of related transactions.74 Almost invariably this means that
joined claims will share a core of common and interlocked facts.
If section 1441 (c) is based on coherent policy, a result rendering
that section largely useless in multi-party cases can be defended.
Permitting removal on the basis of a separate controversy can be
explained, if at all, on the notion that joinder of disconnected
claims should not destroy a defendant's right of removal. But in
multi-party cases, some connection must exist between properly
joined claims under present procedural rules. Section 1441(c),
then, carries the seeds of its own destruction. 75 In multi-party diversity cases, for which it is primarily designed, the rules for joinder
of parties demonstrate that it is needed least. If joinder rules normally result in joinder of claims more than tenuously connected,
then there is little need for rules providing for removal of tenuously connected claims. The paucity of reported cases in the ten years
since Finn which permit section 1441(c) to be used to remove
multi-party cases78 indicates that the practical necessity for its existence in such cases is doubtful. And, since the primary virtue in
jurisdictional rules is ease of application, the use of the cloudy
cause of action concept to mark federal jurisdictional limits in
these cases is even less understandable.
It has been argued that existing rules directed toward disregarding "fraudulent" joinder to defeat diversity are inadequate, necessitating rules to permit removal when joined claims are more
73. The divergent authorities are collected in note 59 supra.
74. See, e.g., FED. R. Crv. P. 20. CLARK 369-72, 389-92. See Note,

52 COLUM. L.

REV.

101, 106-07 (1952), expressing doubt whether any

multi-party case is properly removable under § 1441(c).

75. Leppard v. Jordan's Truck Line, 110 F. Supp. 811 (E.D.S.C. 1953),
permits removal on the basis of misjoined claims, however. The case is
criticized in Note, 67 HAv. L. REv. 519 (1954). However, even if the
statement that claims improperly joined may provide the basis for removal
under § 1441(c) is sound, the need for a removal provision governing claims
misjoined under state law is nonexistent. Should defendants desire, plaintiff
can be required in the state court to proceed only against properly joined
defendants. If misjoinder provided no basis for removal, and the case
against properly joined defendants was removable, defendants could then
perfect removal after the misjoinder was cured. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)
(1958).
76. Twenty-seven cases are cited in note 54 supra. One does not involve

multiple parties, and two do not involve diversity. If those cases where
there is substantial doubt as to the propriety of removal (evidenced by
contrary or difficult-to-distinguish cases denying removal) are excluded, the
remaining 24 cases would be cut substantially. See notes 56-59, 69-70,
supra.
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tenuously connected." Even if this assertion is true, however, the
fault, if any, is with those rules. If it is too easy to defeat diversity
jurisdiction by joinder of nominal parties, it is too easy to do so in
cases where the causes are clearly connected as well as in those
cases where the causes are disconnected.
Section 1441 (c), however, may also be applicable to a limited
number of single-plaintiff-defendant diversity cases, since Congress has provided that specified cases may not be removed. 7 It
is common to provide that one plaintiff may join all claims which
he has against a single defendant. 79 Thus, it is possible, in a case
where two parties are of diverse citizenship, to encounter the joinder
of an unremovable claim with a totally disconnected claim which
would otherwise be removable."0 Assuming that the non-removable claim is sufficiently substantial to pass muster under the fraudulent joinder rules, the combined force of the policies generally
precluding removal of the unremovable claim"' and those permitting joinder argue for leaving the entire litigation in the state court.
In any event, the fact that there are few reported cases of this kind
which permit removal argues against the necessity of general rules
to safeguard against joinder of disconnected non-removable causes
in two-party cases to preclude removal.82
C.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEM IN DIVERSITY CASES

Initially, it should be pointed out that section 1441 (c) applies
to two forms of diversity cases where complete diversity of citizenship exists. In these, there is no constitutional question. In the first
type, discussed immediately above, there are a single plaintiff and
a single defendant of diverse citizenship, but among the plaintiffs
multiple claims is one that Congress has specified as non-removable. The proscription on removal precludes removal under section
33

77. Keeffe & Lacey, The Separable Controversy-A Federal Concept,
CORNELL L.Q. 261, 265 (1947); Keeffe, Thaler, Bernstein, Wright &

Gillmer, supra note 68, at 601-02. Compare Oakley v. Goodnow, 118

U.S. 43 (1886) (colorable assignment to defeat jurisdiction effective) with
Wecker v. National Enameling & Stamping Co., 204 U.S. 176 (1907) (colorable joinder of defendant to defeat removal ineffective).
78. See 28 U.S.C. § 1445 (1958).
79. See FED. R. Civ. P. 18; CLARK 462-63.
80. Of the 27 reported cases permitting removal under § 1441(c) since
Finn, only 1 falls in this category: Emery v. Chicago B. & Q.R.R., 119
F. Supp. 654 (S.D. Iowa 1954). And that decision may be erroneous no
matter what view is taken of the significance of the Finn case.
81. See Moore & Van Dercreek, supra note 25, at 497 n.34.
82. In addition to Emery, 2 cases involving this situation have denied
removal under § 1441(c): Pate v. Standard Dredging Co., 193 F.2d 498
(5th Cir. 1952); Hall v. Illinois Cent. Ry., 152 F. Supp. 549 (W.D. Ky.

1957).
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1441 (a) and section 1441 (b), but if the plaintiff asserts a "claim
or cause of action" that is "separate and independent" from the
non-removable claim, the separate claim "would be removable if
sued upon alone" and thus may arguably provide a basis for removal of the entire litigation under section 1441 (c). 3 In the second type, there are multiple-defendants all of whom are of citizenship diverse from that of the plaintiff, but some defendants are residents of the state of suit or have failed to join in the petition for
removal. Since section 1441 (a) requires all defendants to join in
the petition for removal"4 and section 1441(b) requires that, in
diversity cases, all of the defendants must be nonresidents of the
state of suit,85 sections 1441(a) and 1441(b) do not authorize
removal in such cases even though the action would be within the
district court's original jurisdiction. However, section 1441 (c) may
be invoked by nonresident defendants involved in a separate and
independent claim or cause of action.88 Since, in both situations
complete diversity exists, congressional authority to invoke removal
can be rested simply on the diversity clause of article HI of the
Constitution without reference to the question whether Congress is
empowered to vest jurisdiction in cases of less than complete diversity.
The constitutional problem arises in the more typical section
1441 (c)-diversity cases, where there is only partial diversity. The
83. See notes 80-82 supra. It may be questionable whether removal
should carry the non-removable claim. See note 81 supra.
84. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1958). "Except as otherwise expressly provided

by Act of Congress, any civil action brought in a State court of which the
district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place where such action is pending." See, e.g., Universal Sur. Co. v. Manhattan Fire & Marine
Ins. Co., 157 F. Supp. 606, 610 (D.S.D. 1958).

85. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (1958). "Any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction founded on a claim or right arising
under the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States shall be removable without regard to the citizenship or residence of the parties. Any other
action shall be removable only if none of the parties in interest properly
joined and served as defendants is a citizen of the state in which such action is brought."
86. There is reason to doubt whether § 1441(c) applies to a situation
where removal might have been perfected under §§ 1441(a) and 1441(b)
but for the failure of all defendants to join in the petition for removal.
Universal Sur. Co. v. Manhattan Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 157 F. Supp. 606
(D.S.D. 1958), holds that it does not on the ground that joined separate and
independent claims or causes of action solely against nonresident defendants
would have been removable had such defendants petitioned for removal.
Therefore, the court reasoned that the claim against the removing defendant, even if separate and independent of that against the non-removing defendant, had not been joined with a claim "otherwise non-removable" as

required by § 1441(c).
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pre-1948 statute similarly authorized the removal of cases, on the
basis of a separable controversy, where only partial diversity existed." The Supreme Court never squarely decided whether the

statute was constitutional in authorizing such jurisdiction.ss It is
significant, however, that the basic statutory structure persisted for
nearly three-quarters of a century without a successful constitutional challenge. Two arguments were advanced to sustain the statute.
First was the argument that Strawbridge v. Curtiss,8 in requiring
complete diversity of citizenship, was merely interpreting the Judicial Code's authorization of diversity jurisdiction and not the
parallel language of the Constitution." The second argument was
that of pendent jurisdiction-the remainder of the lawsuit was
pendent to the complete-diversity separable controversy which was

the basis for removal.
The pendent jurisdiction rationale was stated most forcefully by
Judge Holmes in Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Felt.9'
The jurisdiction of merely local controversies that the federal district
courts exercise in cases of removal on the ground of separable controversies is a different class of jurisdiction from that ordinarily defined by the Constitution and statutes of the United States. It is of a
class variously called ancillary, auxiliary, dependent, incidental, or supplementary. It is an extraordinary kind of ancillary jurisdiction in that
it arises from an act of Congress expressly conferring it. Under the
statute, it exists, not in its own right, but by virtue of its relation to
a controversy of which the court is capable of receiving, and has been
given, independent jurisdiction under the Constitution. It is analogous
to such ancillary jurisdiction as is exercised by the courts by virtue of
their inherent powers.
The economical and expeditious administration of justice often requires more than one controversy to be embraced in a single suit, regardless of the citizenship of the parties. Where one of such controversies would be removable to the federal court if separately brought
in a state court, Congress has a reasonable range of legislative discretion to determine whether such suit, in its entirety, shall be left in the
state court, removed to the federal court, or split into two parts.
87. See, e.g., Pullman Co. v. Jenkins, 305 U.S. 534, 539 (1939); Barney
v. Latham, 103 U.S. 205 (1881).
88. See Texas Employers Ins. Ass'n v. Felt, 150 F.2d 227, 233 n.22 (5th
Cir. 1945).
89. 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806).
90. See Sheldon v. Keokuk No. Line Packet Co., 1 Fed. 789, 797 (C.C.
W.D. Wis. 1880); Keeffe & Lacey, The Separable Controversy-A Federal
Removal Concept, 33 CORNELL L.Q. 261, 262 (1947); Keeffe, Thaler, Bernstein, Wright & Gillmer, supranote 68, at 600-01.
91. 150 F.2d 227, 234 (5th Cir. 1945). See also Sperry v. Wabash R.R.,
52 F. Supp. 337, 339 (E.D. I11. 1943); Hoffman v. Lynch, 23 F.2d 518,
521-23 (N.D. Ga. 1928); Bybee v. Hawkett, 5 Fed. 1, 9-10 (C.C.D. Ore.
1880). But see Iowa Homestead Co. v. Des Moines Nav. & Ry., 8 Fed.
97, 105 (S.D. Iowa 1881).
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The primary difficulty with application of the pendent jurisdiction theory to section 1441 (c) diversity cases is that orthodox pendent jurisdiction theory emphasizes connection between the principal and pendent claims. In sharp contrast, section 1441 (c) makes
lack of connection between the removed claims the sine qua non of
removability. The pendent jurisdiction justification for section 1441
(c), then, depends upon a theory which places the constitutional
foundation of pendent jurisdiction on a base broader than close
connection between joined claims. Since section 1441 (c) can constitutionally be predicated upon the diversity clause of article III
without reference to pendent jurisdiction, and since pendent jurisdiction provides the sole justification for application of section
1441 (c) to non-diversity cases, the question whether a broader
foundation for pendent jurisdiction exists will be deferred to the
later discussion of federal question cases. But, as previously indicated, current joinder rules in multi-party cases preclude joinder
of totally disconnected claims and result almost invariably in joinder of causes having a substantial nub of connected and interlocking facts.92 In simple, two-party federal question cases, by contrast, joinder rules may permit joinder of totally disconnected
claims." The joinder rules for multi-party cases may make section 1441 (c) seldom or never applicable in diversity cases as indicated above. But if, as will be discussed below, the constitutional
frontiers of pendent jurisdiction extend at least beyond the narrow
cause-of-action metaphysics of Hum v. Oursler9 4 section 1441 (c)
can be more easily defended on orthodox pendent jurisdiction theories in multi-party diversity cases than in two-party federal question casesY 5
The easier, and more readily apparent, constitutional justification for section 1441 (c) in diversity cases is that "cases" of partial
diversity are "controversies . . . between citizens of different
states" within the meaning of article IM, section 2 of the Constitution.9 The late Professor Chafee, in arguing for jurisdiction in
federal interpleader, has convincingly demonstrated that Strawbridge v. Curtiss97 does not define the constitutional limits of diversity jurisdiction in requiring complete diversity of citizenship.98
92. Note 74 supra.
93. See note 79 supra.
94. 289 U.S. 238 (1933).

95. See text accompanying notes 155-197 infra.
96. "The judicial power shall extend to . . controversies . . . between
citizens of different states . . ."
97. 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806).

98. Chafee, Interpleader in the United States Courts, 41 YALE L.J. 1134,

1165-68 (1932); Chafee, The FederalInterpleaderAct of 1936, 45 YALE L.
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Marshall squarely rested his opinion on the Judiciary Act and not
on the Constitution.99 The Constitution, as a broad outline for
the scheme of national government, need not be cramped by the
limited constructions that practical necessity may demand for similar statutory language. °° Chafee's conclusions have never been
tested in the United States Supreme Court.' But the Interpleader Act °2 has been read to justify jurisdiction on the basis of minimal diversity and, so read, has been upheld by lower federal
courts." 3 Since a conclusion that the Constitution requires complete diversity might sterilize some of the more useful applications
of the federal interpleader device, it is difficult to conclude that
the Supreme Court, squarely faced with the question, would reject
Chafee's argument.'04 If partial diversity meets the constitutional
standard, section 1441(c) could not be beyond constitutional
bounds simply because there is reason to doubt its practical utility
or necessity. There may, however, be constitutional limits even to
the partial diversity theory-limits that Chafee had no call to exJ. 963, 973-74 (1936); Chafee, Federal Interpleader Since the Act of
1936, 49 YALE L.J. 377, 395-98 (1940). For a contrary argument, see McGovney, A Supreme Court Fiction: 11, 56 HAnv. L. REV. 1090, 1103-11
(1943).
99.
The words of the act of Congress are, "where an alien is a party;
or the suit is between a citizen of a state where the suit is brought,
and a citizen of another state."
The court understands these expressions to mean that each distinct interest should be represented by persons, all of whom are entitled
to sue, or may be sued, in the federal courts.
7 U.S. (3 Cranch) at 267. (Emphasis added.)
100. The converse reasons have clearly led to a reading of the general
federal question statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1958), to permit a narrower
scope of federal jurisdiction than might be conferred by a complete grant
of the federal question jurisdiction permitted by article III. Mishkin, The
Federal "Question" in the District Courts, 53 COLUM. L. REv. 157, 162
(1953).
101. There is dicta in Shields v. Barrow, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 130, 145
(1855) referring to the complete diversity requirement as one required both
by the Constitution and the statute. The question was squarely presented in
Blake v. McKein, 103 U.S. 336, 339 (1881) and in Case of the SewingMachine Companies, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 553, 586-87 (1874). In both cases,
statutory interpretation made decision of the constitutional question unnecessary. See also the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Bradley in Removal
Cases, 100 U.S. 457, 479 (1879).
102. 28 U.S.C. § 1335 (1958).
103. See Haynes v. Felder, 239 F.2d 868 (5th Cir. 1957) and cases
therein cited.
104. The constitutional question was presented in an interpleader case in
Treinies v. Sunshine Mining Co., 308 U.S. 66 (1939). Disregarding the stakeholder, the suit was found to satisfy the requirement of complete diversity,
making it unnecessary to determine whether the interpleader statute or the
Constitution authorized jurisdiction in cases of minimal diversity. Id. at
71-72.
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plore. Thus it may be argued that Congress could not call disparate,
unconnected litigation a "case" and assert federal jurisdiction merely because of some diversity of citizenship in parties to the disconnected parts." 5 But, again, the joinder rules which raise questions
as to the utility of section 1441 (c) ease the task of constitutional
interpretation. Since those joinder rules require some connection
between joined claims in multi-party cases, 0 6 section 1441 (c)
does not reach the constitutional frontier in those cases which certainly can be as easily considered a "case"' in the constitutional
sense as can the interpleader cases. Marking the boundaries of the
frontier, if it exists, can then be left to some more radical congressional experiment.
D.

CONCLUSION

In diversity cases, section 1441 (c) is of doubtful utility if it is
assumed that it rests upon saving the right to remove which would
have existed but for the joinder of disconnected claims. In multiparty diversity cases, joinder rules forbidding joinder of totally disconnected claims provide built-in protection against joinder of disconnected claims to preclude removal. To the extent that cause-ofaction metaphysics are utilized by courts to permit removal under
section 1441(c), it will continue to be difficult to formulate coherent policies to distinguish those cases held not removable under
section 1441 (c). The few cases which have been removed provide
scant justification for the cloudy and troublesome line which must
be drawn to define the "separate and independent claim or cause
of action." But the same joinder rules which preclude joinder of
disconnected claims in multi-party diversity cases make it easier to
bring section 1441 (c) within the ambit of the constitutional justifications given to uphold removal under the former separable controversy statute. Since joined claims in cases which raise the constitutional issue will, if properly joined, share a core of connecting
facts, section 1441 (c) can be upheld in such cases on the basis of
partial diversity.
III.

SECTION 1441 (c) IN FEDERAL_ QUESTION CASES

The application of section 1441 (c) to non-diversity cases raises
special problems for three reasons. First, the pre-1948 separable
controversy statute, by its terms, applied only to diversity cases."'
105. HART & WECHSLER 1046.

106. See note 74 supra.
107. The separable controversy statute permitted removal only of a
separable controversy "which is wholly between citizens of different states."
28 U.S.C. § 71 (1940).
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Separate controversies arising under the Constitution or laws of the
United States did, however, provide a basis for excission and removal of the separate controversy.' Since section 1441 (c) provides for removal of the "entire case" on the basis of a "separate
and independent claim or cause of action, which would be removable if sued upon alone" it is clear both that section 1441 (c) is
not limited in its application to diversity cases, and that in nondiversity cases section 1441 (c) will operate to expand rather than
contract removal jurisdiction. Second, without the aid of section
1441 (c), cases of joined federal and non-federal claims can be
removed so long as the joined claims would be within the district
court's original jurisdiction." 9 The district court would have original jurisdiction of joined non-federal claims sufficiently related to
the federal claim to be "pendent" to it."' With the adoption
of section 1441(c), removal will also carry a joined non-federal
claim which is sufficiently unrelated to constitute a "separate and
independent claim or cause of action.""' This creates problems
of interpretation. Is it possible for a joined non-federal claim to be
neither sufficiently related to fall within the ambit of original pendent jurisdiction, nor sufficiently unrelated to constitute a "separate
and independent claim or causes of action"? Or must a joined nonfederal claim inevitably be either sufficiently related to be pendent
to the federal claim, or sufficiently unrelated to be separate and
independent? Third, section 1441 (c), as in a small proportion of
the diversity cases,"' applies to non-diversity cases between a single plaintiff and a single defendant. Under joinder rules permitting3
joinder by plaintiff of all claims against the single defendant,"
properly joined claims can be totally disconnected in such cases.
And, unlike the diversity cases of this type," 4 permitting removal
of the entire cases presents serious constitutional problems. Where
removal is effected under section 1441 (c) on the basis of properly
joined unrelated claims, removal can be justified only on the argument that the constitutional frontier of the pendent jurisdiction
concept encompasses factually unrelated as well as related claims.
A.

THE

INTERPRETATION PROBLEM IN NON-DIVERSITY CASES

Understanding the problem of application raised by section
1441 (c) in cases arising under federal law necessitates an excur108. See, e.g., Pacific R.R. Removal Cases, 115 U.S. 1, 18-23 (1885).

109. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1958).
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Hum v. Oursler, 289 U.S. 238 (1933).
See note 30 supra.
See note 80 supra.
See note 79 supra.
See text accompanying note 82 supra.
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sion into the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction, and the leading Supreme Court decision, Hum v. Oursler.1" 5 There plaintiffs brought
an original action in federal district court to enjoin performance
of defendants' play, alleging that defendants had infringed plaintiffs' copyrighted play and were also guilty of common-law unfair
competition by appropriating the idea of a spiritualistic seance
from plaintiffs' copyrighted play. The complaint further alleged unfair competition in appropriation of the same idea from an uncopyrighted revision of plaintiffs' play. The district court, finding
no infringement, dismissed the copyright claim on the merits, and
dismissed the remaining two claims for lack of jurisdiction. The
Second Circuit affirmed."1 6 The Supreme Court held that the decree should be modified to dismiss the claim for unfair competition growing out of the alleged copying of the copyrighted play
on the merits. The non-federal claim based on the uncopyrighted
play, however, was held to be dismissed properly for lack of jurisdiction. Mr. Justice Sutherland's opinion quoted language in
Siler v. Louisville & Nashville R.R."7 to the effect that once jurisdiction had attached by reason of the existence of a federal question the court "had the right to decide all the questions in the case,
even though it decided the Federal questions adversely to the party
raising them, or even if it omitted to decide them at all, but decided the case on local or state questions only."' "18 But, to this
proposition, he added an important qualification:
But the rule does not go so far as to permit a federal court to assume jurisdiction of a separate and distinct non-federal cause of ac-

tion because it is joined in the same complaint with a federal cause of
action. The distinction to be observed is between a case where two
distinct grounds in support of a single cause of action are alleged, one
only of which presents a federal question, and a case where two separate and distinct causes of action are alleged, one only of which is
federal in character. In the former, where the federal question averred
is not plainly wanting in substance, the federal court, even though
the federal ground be not established, may nevertheless retain and dispose of the case upon the nonfederal ground; in the latter it may not
do so upon the nonfederal cause of action.11 9

The claim for unfair competition constituted simply an alternative
non-federal ground to the infringement claim since it sought redress for the same "wrong"-the right to protection of the copy115.
116.
117.
118.

289 U.S. 238 (1933).
61 F.2d 1031 (2d Cir. 1932).
213 U.S. 175, 191 (1909).
289 U.S. at 243.

119. Id. at 245-46.

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:1

righted play. 20 The Court further emphasized that the non-federal claim rested upon identical facts 2 ' and that the disposition
of the federal claim on the merits also disposed of the non-federal
claim." 2 The unfair competition claim relating to the uncopyrighted revision, however, alleged violation of a "distinct right"
to protection of the uncopyrighted revision. Since this claim represented a "separate and distinct cause of action," the district court

had properly dismissed it for lack of jurisdiction.' 23

Since Hum, the debate has continued as to the appropriate scope
of a "cause of action" for pendent jurisdiction.'24 On the one
side have been the arguments for narrow construction to require,
as in Hum itself, almost complete identity of facts for the exercise
of pendent jurisdiction.'25 The proponents of a more expansive
view of a "cause of action" have argued that a single cause should
be found where the facts sufficiently overlap to provide a basis for
conveniently trying the federal and non-federal claims together.16
120. Id. at 246-47.
121. Id. at 246.

122. Id. at 247.
123. Id. at 248.

124. The Supreme Court has significantly touched on the doctrine only
once since Hum. Armstrong Paint & Varnish Works v. Nu-Enamel Paint
Corp., 305 U.S. 315 (1938). Cf. Romero v. International Terminal Operating
Co., 358 U.S. 354, 380-81 (1959). The debate was complicated by the
enactment, in 1948, of 28 U.S.C. § 1338(b) (1958) which provides: "The
district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action asserting a
claim of unfair competition when joined with a substantial and related claim
under the copyright, patent or trade-mark laws." (Emphasis added.) The
Reviser's Note to § 1338 hardly clarifies the problem whether the statute
was intended to do more than codify the Hurn principle:
Subsection (b) is added and is intended to avoid "piecemeal" litigation
to enforce common-law and statutory copyright, patent, and trademark rights by specifically permitting such enforcement in a single civil
action in the district court. While this is the rule under federal decisions, this section would enact it as statutory authority. The problem
is discussed at length in Hum v. Oursler . . . and in Musher Founda-

tion v. Alba Trading Co. (C.C.A. 1942), 127 F.2d 9, (majority and
dissenting opinions).
Because copyright, patent or trade-mark claims are within exclusive federal jurisdiction, the removal procedures of § 1441(c) are inapposite. 28
U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1958). Lambert Run Coal Co. v. Baltimore & O.R.R.,
258 U.S. 377 (1922); cf. Freeman v. Bee Mach. Co., 319 U.S. 448 (1943).
125. See, e.g., Dann v. Studebaker-Packard Corp., 288 F.2d 201 (6th
Cir. 1961); French Renovating Co. v. Ray Renovating Co., 170 F.2d 945
(6th Cir. 1948); Newport Indus., Inc. v. Crosby Naval Stores, Inc., 139
F.2d 611 (5th Cir. 1944); Musher Foundation, Inc. v. Alba Trading Co.,
127 F.2d 9 (2d Cir. 1942).
126. See, e.g., Maternally Yours, Inc. v. Your Maternity Shop, Inc., 234
F.2d 538 (2d Cir. 1956) (interpreting 28 U.S.C. § 1338(b); see note 124
supra); Hanson v. Triangle Publications, Inc., 163 F.2d 74 (8th Cir. 1947);
Musher Foundation, Inc. v. Alba Trading Co., 127 F.2d 9, 11 (2d Cir.
1942) (dissent). MooRE 150; CLARK 465-66.
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How does the controversy as to the scope of pendent jurisdiction
in federal question cases affect section 1441 (c)? Perhaps the problem can best be understood in the framework of the following
hypothetical case.
A brings an action for damages in four counts against B in a
state court. A and B are of common citizenship. Count one alleges
that B, a police officer acting "under color of state law" had illegally held him incommunicado and had beaten him. Count two
alleges the same facts, but omits the allegation that B's actions
were "under color of state law." Count three alleges the theft of
A's watch by B during the interrogation. Count four alleges the
non-payment of a past-due promissory note held by A and signed
by B. Count one, standing alone, presents a federal claim which
would be within the district court's original jurisdiction. 1 7 Under
any interpretation of Hum v. Oursler, Count two is pendent to
Count one.'
If the complaint, then, had been limited to the
first two counts, the action would be removable without reference
to section 1441 (c). 29 Count four, probably, is a "separate and
independent claim or cause of action" under any interpretation of
section 1441 (c).130 If the complaint were limited to the first, second and fourth counts, counts one and two would be "removable
if sued upon alone" and the entire case could be removed under
section 1441 (c). But what of the third count? The entire case is
removable, whether it is pendent to the first count or, like the
fourth, "separate and independent."' 3' Is it possible that the third
count fits neither category-that it is too unrelated to the first
count to be pendent to it, yet too related to the first two counts
to be "separate and independent"? If so, the entire case is nonremovable.132 Or do the two concepts dovetail so that the joined
non-federal claim must be either pendent or "separate and independent"?
Lewin argues that a hiatus does exist.'3 3 The argument first in127. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
128. The only factual difference is the absence of the "color of law"
allegation from count two. Thus, even under the more restrictive interpretation of Hum, count two is probably properly pendent to count one. See
cases cited noted 125 supra.
129. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1958).
130. See text accompanying notes 69-70 supra.
131. If count three is pendent to count one, counts one, two and three
represent a claim "removable if sued upon alone." If count three is "separate and independent," it would, like count four, come along with the removal of counts one and two.
132. Counts one, two and three would not then be "removable if sued
upon alone," and counts one and two would not be "separate and independent" of count three.
133. Lewin, The Federal Courts' Hospitable Back Door-Removal of
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terprets the words "separate and independent" in section 1441 (c)
to permit the removal only of "entirely unrelated" claims. At the
same time, a narrower view of the "cause of action" concept of
pendent jurisdiction is taken, requiring considerable factual overlapping for the existence of a unitary cause of action. Thus, a
tripartite division emerges, not unlike the tripartite division which
existed under the separable controversy statute in diversity cases,
between related, less related and unrelated claims. Professors Moore
and Van Dercreek, conceding that "the matter is not without difficulty," have argued that "in most instances" a claim is either pendent or "separate and independent.' 13 However, they also seem
to countenance the possibility of a hiatus between pendent jurisdiction and section 1441 (c) in the case of joined federal and nonfederal claims which represent two causes of action not "separate
and independent.""
Concededly, tenable arguments can be built to support such a
hiatus-through a narrow view of "cause of action" for pendent jurisdiction purposes136 coupled with a broad "cause of action" concept under section 1441 (c), 111 or through emphasis on the words
"separate and independent" as qualifying "cause of action" in section 1441 (c). But such a construction has little to commend it. It
necessitates placing state claims joined with federal claims into
three pigeonholes based upon the degree of connection between
them, making for even more difficulty than in diversity cases where
section 1441 (c) requires the drawing of only one line."3 It was
just such a tripartite division, necessitated by the separable controversy statute in diversity cases," 9 that the Revisers intended to
abolish by the adoption of section 1441(c).140 If, on the other
hand, pendent jurisdiction and section 1441 (c) are fully complementary, the necessity for drawing any line vanishes. If state
claims joined with federal claims in state court actions must be
either pendent to the federal claim or separate and independent, the
entire case may be removed in any event. Once the case is removed, the determination of whether to retain the entire case for
"Separate and Independent" Non-Federal Causes of Action, 66 HAnv. L.
REv. 423, 441 (1953). See Note, 52 COLUM. L. REv. 101, 111-12 (1952).

134. Moore & Van Dercreek, Multi-Party, Multi-Claim Removal Problems: The Separate and Independent Claim Under Section 1441(c), 46
IowA L. REv. 489, 506 n.81 (1961).
135. Ibid.

136. See cases cited note 125 supra.

137. See text accompanying note 70 supra.
138. The single line, of course, is not easy to draw. See text accompanying notes 55-60, 69-70 supra.
139. See text accompanying note 17 supra.
140. See text preceding note 35 supra.
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federal trial or remand a portion can depend upon pragmatic factors of trial convenience, thus avoiding the impossible problem of
attempting to formulate abstract verbal formulae to determine what
degree of togetherness or apartness wiJ1 justify removal.141 And,
since the question of federal or state trial is left to the trial judge's
discretion, there is less chance of appellate reversal after trial
which would exist if the question of federal or state trial were
made an orthodox jurisdictional determination. 14 2
Providing a rational and workable structure and avoiding the
rock of line-drawing on which section 1441 (c) has faltered in diversity cases'1 3 is probably reason enough for interpreting section
1441 (c) and pendent jurisdiction as fully complementary in removed federal question cases. And, such a construction does not

do violence to either the pendent jurisdiction concept or to section

1441 (c). The parallel between the Court's language in Hurn v.
Oursler'44 and the words of section 1441 (c) is striking. In
Hum, the Court refers to the non-federal claims beyond the scope
of pendent jurisdiction as those which are "separate and distinct."'' 15 Section 1441(c) permits removal if the federal claim is
"separate and independent."' 4 While it is doubtful that the Re141. Of course, there is no discretion to remand "pendent" state claims,
since they are part of the claim "removable if sued upon alone" and not
matter "not otherwise within" the district court's "original jurisdiction."
Yet, it is more than unlikely that the district court will find persuasive reason to remand on the ground that trial convenience does not necessitate a
single trial, yet conclude at the same time that there is no discretion to
remand because the non-federal claim is pendent. Cf. Bell v. Hood, 71 F.
Supp. 813, 819-20 (S.D. Cal. 1947); HART & WEcHSLER 808. In any event,
the remand order would not be reviewable. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) (1958).
142. Such appellate unscrambling of jurisdictional determinations may
be disastrous in removed cases where the plaintiff has fought removal, won
on the merits after losing the removal fight, and then had the fruits of victory snatched away by defendant's contention on appeal that the removal
he procured was in error. On remand of the Finn case, the district court
set aside plaintiffs victory against the non-resident defendant and ordered
a new trial. The court of appeals allowed plaintiff to keep his judgment by
allowing plaintiff to dismiss as to the absolved defendants, thereby "perfecting" jurisdiction. Finn v. American Fire & Cas. Co., 207 F.2d 113 (5th
Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 912 (1954). Still, it took five years and
two appellate proceedings in the court of appeals, one in the Supreme Court,
and an additional hearing in the district court for plaintiff to vindicate the
jurisdictional propriety of his judgment. Should judgment have gone only
against the non-resident defendant, this sort of rescue work would have
failed and plaintiff would have been compelled to begin again.
143. See text accompanying notes 55-60 supra.
144. 289 U.S. 238 (1933).
145. Id. at 246.
146. If there is any distinction between claims or causes of action that
are "separate and distinct" and those which are "separate and independent," the author would hesitate to draw it.
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visers considered the impact of section 1441 (c) beyond diversity
cases, in light of the Revisers' clearly stated purpose to simplify

removal 47 it is not difficult to attribute to the Revisers an intention in federal question cases to place all non-federal claims beyond the scope of pendent jurisdiction automatically into the category of "separate and independent claims or causes of action."

Nor need the fear of an impending flood of litigation stand in
the way of a construction of section 1441 (c) permitting removal
of the entire case whenever it contains a claim arising under federal
law. First, it should be pointed out that federal claims which pass
all the tests for original federal jurisdiction cannot be conjured out
of thin air. 4 ' Federal law must form the basis of the plaintiff's
claim and not merely the basis of the defendant's defense. 4 "

More important, the plaintiff's claim must arise "directly" out of
Finally, the plaintiff is master of his case, and,
federal law.'
should he desire to keep his case in state court, could base his

claim squarely on state law rather than assert a parallel federal
right-at least where federal law has not pre-empted concurrent
state remedies." 1 Second, and most persuasive in minimizing
the "flood of litigation" argument is the fact that, since 1948, no
such flood has been forthcoming. Indeed, only two reported cases

have been faced squarely with the problem of reconciling section
1441(c) and pendent jurisdiction. In one of these cases, removal
was appropriate, on an alternative ground, without reference to

section 1441(c).152 In the other case the correlative interpreta147. See Reviser's Note, note 39 supra; American Fire & Cas. Co. v.
Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 9 (1951).
148. Mishkin, The Federal "Question" in the District Courts, 53 COLUM.
L. REv.157, 182 (1953).
149. Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667, 672 (1950);
Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908).
150. Gully v. First Nat'l Bank, 299 U.S. 109 (1936).
151. Albright v. Teas, 106 U.S. 613 (1883). Even where the defendant
claims that federal law has pre-empted the state claim asserted by plaintiff,
the federal defense provides no basis for removal. Tennessee v. Union &
Planters' Bank, 152 U.S. 454 (1894). Cf. Amalgamated Clothing Workers
v. Richman Bros., 348 U.S. 511 (1955). Where pre-emption has occurred
by the creation of a federal remedy, however, the court may construe
plaintiffs complaint as seeking the federal remedy and thus arising under
federal law despite plaintiff's insistence that he is seeking the state remedy.
Swift & Co. v. United Packinghouse Workers, 177 F. Supp. 511, 512-13
(D. Colo. 1959).
152. Tsavdaridis v. T. J. Stevenson & Co., 165 F. Supp. 174 (S.D.N.Y.
1958). An alien seaman asserted three claims against a Delaware corporation in a New York state court. Plaintiff's amended complaint sought: (1)
$1,788 damages for breach of contract of employment; (2) $1,416 damages for breach of federal statutes (46 U.S.C. §§ 567, 568, 575 and 578)
in carrying plaintiff to sea without a written agreement; (3) $2,990 damages for breach of federal statutes (46 U.S.C. §§ 596, 597) precluding
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tion of pendent jurisdiction and section 1441 (c) is clearly adopted. ' The lack of reported cases, however, raises serious questions
as to the necessity of a statute permitting removal jurisdiction
broader than the scope of original federal jurisdiction. If we are
to judge by the reported cases, in non-diversity cases the only
achievement of section 1441(c) has, thus far, been to spare one
district judge the necessity of determining whether joined nonfederal claims were pendent.' 54 On this evidence, it would seem
that, so far as federal question cases are concerned, the repeal of
section 1441 (c)would be less than significant in its impact upon
withholding wages without sufficient cause. The court held that the action
was removable under § 1441(a) on the ground that plaintiff was an alien
and the three claims could be aggregated to meet the then jurisdictional
amount requirement of $3,000. As an alternative ground, the court concluded that since the second and third claims aggregated more than the jurisdictional amount, and would be properly removable, the entire litigation
was properly removable. "Ihe remaining claim (breach of employment
contract and failure to pay wages) can be retained under the doctrine of
pendent jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) (1952)." 165 F .Supp. at 176-77.
It is difficult to determine from the bare citation of § 1441(c) whether
the district court interpreted § 1441(c) as simply restating the doctrine of
pendent jurisdiction (which it obviously does not, see text accompanying
note 157 infra) or meant to conclude that the first claim must either be
pendent to the other two claims or separate and independent. Cf. Darwin
v. Jess Hickey Oil Corp., 153 F. Supp. 667, 673 (N.D. Tex. 1957).
153. Swift & Co. v. United Packinghouse Workers, 177 F. Supp. 511
(D. Colo. 1959). This was an action brought in a state court by an employer against an international union, a union local and officials of the
local. Seeking damages and specific relief, the following three claims were
made against all defendants: (1) breach of the collective bargaining agreement; (2) conspiracy to violate the collective bargaining agreement; (3) inducing others to break the collective bargaining agreement. Defendants
moved to remove, alleging that plaintiff is an employer in industry affecting commerce and that defendants are representatives of employees in
industry affecting commerce. On plaintiffs motion to remand, the court
remanded so much of the complaint as sought injunctive relief on the
ground that jurisdiction had been withdrawn by the Norris-LaGuardia
Act, 47 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (1958). Insofar as the
three claims sought damages, however, the entire action was held properly
removable. The first claim was held to be one arising under federal law.
Labor Management Relations Act § 301(a), 61 Stat. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C.
§ 185(a) (1958). "Whether plaintiff's three causes of action be considered
as 'separate and independent' under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1441(c), or as a single
cause of action under the 'single wrong' test, . . . does not affect the
disposition to be made of this motion. If the allegations of conspiracy
and interference of contractual relations be considered as separate and independent causes of action, they may be removed under 28 U.S.C.A.
§ 1441(c) along with the cause of action for breach of contract; whereas, if there is but one cause of action for a wrong, the primary wrong
against the plaintiff is the breach of the collective bargaining agreement
and the cause may be removed under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1441(a)." 177 F.
Supp. at 515.
154. Swift & Co. v. United Packinghouse Workers, 177 F. Supp. 511
(D. Colo. 1959).
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federal judicial business. And, if section 1441(c) applied solely
to federal question cases, a persuasive case for the necessity of
such a provision would be difficult to make.
B.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEM IN NON-DIVERSITY CASES

If the application of section 1441(c) to federal question cases
proposed above is sound, section 1441 (c) permits removal of the
entire litigation whenever plaintiff asserts a claim arising directly
under federal law regardless of the number and relationship of
non-federal claims joined. As previously indicated, the Court's
opinion in Hum v. Oursler 5 states clearly that the rule of pendent jurisdiction "does not go so far as to permit a federal court
to assume jurisdiction of a separate and distinct non-federal cause
of action because it is joined in the same complaint with a federal
cause of action."'5 6 Under any construction of section 1441(c),
it is clear that section 1441 (c) does go so far. 7 Can section
1441 (c) then be constitutional?
The constitutional question has caused much perplexity and has
been the subject of lengthy debate.'5 8 As previously indicated,
the separable controversy statute was defended on grounds, among
others, of pendent jurisdiction. Since section 1441(c) so clearly
authorizes jurisdiction beyond the traditional scope of pendent jurisdiction in federal question cases, the arguments advanced to
bolster the separable controversy statute are of little help. Yet the
155. 289 U.S. 238 (1933).
156. 289 U.S. at 245-46.
157. Whether or not there is a hiatus between statutory pendent jurisdiction and § 1441(c)-see text accompanying notes 131-41 supra-§ 1441
(c) permits removal of "separate and independent" non-federal claims. If
§ 1441(c) operated only to permit removal of all claims pendent under the
Hurn principle, it would have no effect on removal in federal question
cases. If all non-federal claims are pendent to asserted federal claims, removal would be appropriate under § 1441(a). See note 129 supra. Cf.
Tsavaridis v. T. J. Stevenson & Co., 165 F. Supp. 174 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
158. A partial list, in addition to the commentary cited and discussed
below, would include: Duvall, Removal-The "Separate and Independent
Claim," 7 OKLA. L. REv. 385, 391 (1954); 6 OHLINGER, FEDERAL PRAcTIcE § 26.6 (rev. ed. 1954); Wills & Boyer, Proposed Changes in Federal
Removal Jurisdiction and Procedure, 9 OHIO ST. L.J. 257, 268 (1948);
Note, 40 CALIF. L. REV. 317, 320 n.18 (1952); Note, 10 U. PITT. L. REv.
385, 389 (1949); Note, 33 MINN. L. REv. 738, 742 n.19 (1949); Note,
42 ILL. L. REV. 105, 110-11 (1947). For discussion of the constitutional
problem under the pre-1948 separable controversy statute, see Keeffe,
Thaler, Bernstein, Wright & Gillmer, Venue and Removal Jokers in the
New Federal Judicial Code, 38 VA. L. REv. 569, 600-01 (1952); Keefe &
Lacey, The Separable Controversy-A Federal Concept, 33 CORNELL L.Q.
261, 262-63 (1947); Holmes, The Separable Controversy-A Federal Removal Concept, 12 Miss. L.J. 163, 170-71 (1939); Note, 94 U. PA. L. REv.
239 (1946).
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constitutional argument over the validity of section 1441(c) has
roots which predate the passage of section 1441(c) by 20 years.
A Note in the 1928 Harvard Law Review concluded that Congress could authorize removal of the entire suit based upon a "separate" controversy which would have been within original federal
jurisdiction.'59 After mentioning that the validity of separable
controversy removal was unquestioned, this conclusion was based
solely on the ground that, the distinction between separate and separable controversies, which the Note had discovered to be cloudy
60
and confusing, could not be a constitutional law distinction.
The later citation of the HarvardLaw Review Note in the Reviser's
Note to6 section 1441 (c) indicates that the Revisers acted on this
advice.'
The proposal and passage of section 1441(c), however, occasioned some constitutional doubts. Professor Moore defended the
validity of section 1441 (c) rather abruptly by stating that it was
within congressional power to restrict removal by eliminating the
separable controversy, and to substitute "one of two or more causes
of action as a basis of removal" while retaining "the convenience
of the joinder of actions, by providing that the entire case should
be kept as a unit for removal purposes.' 62
After the decision in Finn, the cause of the constitutional doubters was strengthened by a scholarly article by Mr. Lewin. 163 Mr.
Lewin noted that as distinguished from separable controversy removal, the lack of relationship between joined federal and nonfederal claims which would place the non-federal claims beyond the
ambit of pendent jurisdiction in an original action provided the
basis for removal under section 1441 (c).164 From the decision
in Hum v. Oursler65 and other fields of ancillary jurisdiction, he
concluded that Congress lacked power to permit institution originally in federal court, or removal to federal court, of separate and
independent non-federal causes of action joined with federal causes
of action since such litigation could not be considered as one "case"
159. Note, 41 HARv. L. REv. 1048 (1928).
160. Id. at 1049 n.13. The author appears to have been thinking in terms
of multi-party diversity cases. "If the causes are properly joined under

common law rules, Congress may clearly authorize the removal of an entire suit containing 'separate' controversies, one or more of which would not
have been within the jurisdiction of the federal courts if sued on independently." Id. at 1049. Cf. text accompanying notes 92-95 supra.
161. See note 39 supra.
162. MooRE 253.
163. Lewin, supra note 133, at 431-42.

164. Id. at 441-42.
165. 289 U.S. 238 (1933).
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within the meaning of article I][, section 2.166 Finally, he argued that procedural and trial convenience "provide no valid
grounds for flouting express basic limitations."' 67 Nor could the
statute be saved by the trial judge's discretion to remand, "since
it confers a discretion to take jurisdiction not constitutionally conferred."' 68
Since the Lewin article, section 1441(c) remained largely undefended until recently, when its defense was renewed by Professors Moore and Van Dercreek 6 9 They reiterate Moore's earlier
statement that the constitutional problem lacks substance. 70 Basically, they argue for a "broad and liberal construction of article
7
IlI of the Constitution" to give its language a "living flexibility.' '
The "legitimate end" sought by section 1441 (c) is the restriction
of removal while preserving the unity of the lawsuit. 7 2 Hum, they
argue, merely represents an interpretation of jurisdictional statutes
rather than the Constitution.1 73 Finally, arguing by analogy to
suits by and against federal receivers, they claim that the Constitution does not require a relationship between claims to invoke the
ancillary concept. 74
With all deference, both the constitutional attack and the defense leave disturbing questions unanswered. Lewin's thesis is built
entirely on the foundation of an assumption that the limits of pendent jurisdiction drawn in Hum'76 are constitutional limits. The
foundation, however, is assumed and not proved. 6 Even the pro166. Lewin, supra note 133, at 434-35.

167. Id. at 436.

168. Id. at 442 n.48.
169. Moore & Van Dercreek, supra note 134, at 495-98.
170.

It seemed that the constitutional problem was not of large dimen-

sion, but we did not reckon with a peculiar school of American constitutional law. In this school the legislative outs believe the ins act

unconstitutionally, and the commentators treat both the ins and the
outs as suspect. In deference to a judicial murmur and a learned article we shall add a few thoughts, mindful always that extensive treatment of the problem tends to give a substance, while the decisions

of the courts reflect none.
Id. at 495-96. (Footnotes omitted.)

171. Id. at 496.
172. Id. at 497.
173. Id. at 498.
174. Ibid.
175. 289 U.S. 238 (1933).
176. After citing the language in Hum to the effect that the rule of
pendent jurisdiction "does not go so far as to permit a federal court to as-

sume jurisdiction of a separate and distinct non-federal cause of action
because it is joined in the same complaint with a federal cause of action,"
289 U.S. at 245-46, the following statement is made: "Thus it seems clear

that a 'separate and independent' non-federal claim is not constitutionally
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ponents of a narrow construction of the jurisdictional grants in
article III of the Constitution are willing to concede that many jurisdictional limits found by courts in general jurisdiction statutes
merely constitute statutory interpretation rather than a limiting construction of parallel constitutional provisions.' This is particularly true in the case of interpretations of the general federal question
statute.' Particularly, it is difficult to understand why the cause
of action metaphysics in Hum are indelibly inscribed as constitutional limitations. If it is urged that Hum does more than interpret
jurisdictional statutes, the burden of proof must be on the proponent of that position. Further, once having made the assumption
that Hum is a constitutional decision, Lewin is willing to accept
the possibility that the complete diversity requirement of Strawbridge v. Curtiss7 ' is not a constitutional requirement.18 0 More
surprising, although he contends that litigation joining unrelated
federal and state claims cannot be a "case" arising under federal
law within the meaning of article II0 of the Constitution, Lewin
is willing to concede that, with partial diversity of citizenship the
same litigation may constitute a "case" between citizens of different
states within article In. '
Moore and Van Dercreek properly point out that Lewin's case
rests upon an unproven assumption. They do not contend, however,
that because pendent or ancillary jurisdictional limits are not constitutionally defined in Hum, that there are no constitutional limits.
Rather, they seem to argue, the question is whether extension of
pendent jurisdiction may be supported when related to a legitimate
congressional end." 2 Up to this point, their argument is easy
within the jurisdiction of the federal courts." Lewin, supra note 133, at
434. (Emphasis added.) Lewin's statement that trial convenience does not
excuse "flouting express basic limitations," id. at 436, is significant only
if it is assumed that the Hurn principle does provide that limitation.
Cf. Darwin v. Jess Hickey Oil Corp., 153 F. Supp. 667 (N.D. Tex. 1957).
This is a case brought originally in federal court and involving, inter alia,
the problem of determining whether a claim under the Texas Securities
Act was pendent to a claim stated under the Federal Securities Act. The
court cites the Finn case for the proposition that separate and independent
non-federal claims are not within the constitutional jurisdiction of the federal courts, and that the 1948 Judicial Code restricted jurisdiction of nonfederal matters! Id. at 673.
177. See, e.g., Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.
S. 354, 379-80 (1959) ("It is a statute, not a Constitution, we are expounding."); Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448,
470 (1957) (dissenting opinion).
178. See Mishkin, supra note 148, at 160-63.
179. 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806).
180. Lewin, supra note 133, at 442 n.48.
181. Ibid.
182. "There is nothing about it [§ 1441(c)] that smacks of arbitrary ac-
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enough to follow. But the legitimate end which they put forward
as supporting pendent jurisdiction under section 1441 (c) is that
of restricting removal while preserving the unity of the lawsuit. It
may be true that, taken as a whole, section 1441 (c) permits the
removal of fewer cases than were removable under the prior separable controversy statute. But while section 1441 (c)precludes removal of many cases formerly removable, its structure permits removal of entire cases formerly removable only in part, if at all.""
This is particularly true in federal question cases to which the
former separable controversy statute was inapplicable."8 4 To the
extent that section 1441 (c) enlarges jurisdiction on removal, it is
little answer to contend that the enlargement must be valid for
the purpose of restricting jurisdiction because jurisdiction in other
cases has been restricted.
The question then becomes whether section 1441(c) can be
fitted into a legitimate and relevant congressional purpose. That
legitimate end can be found in the protection of litigants' access
to the federal courts."8 5 The trend of procedural reform has been
consistently in the direction of permitting the joinder in one lawsuit of all matters which can be most efficiently and expeditiously
tried together. 88 If the constitutional limits of federal jurisdiction
are not large enough to encompass multi-claim cases where some
claims only fit within the article III categories, the parties may
not have a truly free choice between state and federal court. Practicalities of expense and convenience may force them into state
courts in states with enlightened joinder provisions permitting an
efficient single trial of all matters rather than piecemeal trial of
state and federal claims. And, where federal question claims are
placed within exclusive federal court jurisdiction, Congress should
not be compelled to require parties to bear the expense of inconvenient multiple trials as the constitutionally-required price of extion unrelated to a legitimate end of restricting removal, yet preserving
the unity of a law suit." Moore & Van Dercreek, supra note 134, at 497.
"The fact that claim two is unrelated to claim one does not necessarily
put it beyond the pale of ancillary jurisdiction." Id. at 498. (Emphasis added.)
183. Moore and Van Dercreek seem to argue that a fortiori a case removable as a whole under the separable controversy statute would not be
removable under § 1441(c), while those cases removable in part under the
separate controversy doctrine now are removable in toto. Id. at 490-91;

cf. text accompanying notes 36-39 supra. Thus Moore and Van Dercreek
are arguing that enlarged removal of cases in class A can be defended as
a reduction of removal jurisdiction because cases in class B, formerly removable, have been withdrawn from removal jurisdiction.
184. Note 107 supra.
185. Cf. Mishkin, supranote 148, at 195-96.
186. See CLARK 434-35.
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clusive federal jurisdiction." 7 Therefore, the constitutional scope
of pendent jurisdiction in federal question cases should encompass, at a minimum, all claims which can be expeditiously tried in
a single proceeding. 8 s And, since there is no constitutional obstacle to permitting broader removal jurisdiction than original jurisdiction, 8 9 there can be no objection that Congress has extended this larger scope of pendent jurisdiction only to removed cases.
But in single plaintiff-single defendant federal question cases,
section 1441(c) permits removal of all claims joined in the proceeding without reference to the convenience of a single proceeding.' If it is true that the constitutional frontier of pendent jurisdiction extends to embrace only those joined non-federal claims
which can be tried conveniently in a single proceeding with the
federal claims, is section 1441 (c) unconstitutional in granting discretion to retain all "otherwise non-removable" claims? Certainly,
section 1441 (c) can be read as not giving an uninformed, unbridled discretion to the district judge.' 9' There are no reported cases
where "otherwise non-removable claims" have been retained for
federal court trial separate from the removed claims. It is difficult,
perhaps impossible, to formulate any verbal standard which will
define for a myriad of cases that degree of relationship between
joined causes which will result in a more expeditious joint trial as
opposed to separate trial. For this reason, the trend of procedural
reform is toward giving up the effort-at least in cases with single
plaintiffs and single defendants.' 92 The question whether the relationship between the joined claims is too tenuous to make joint
trial advantageous is left to the trial judge's discretion. Such a system has obvious advantages over employing a cumbersome verbal
187. Indeed, the pendent jurisdiction problem is most acute where the
federal claim is within exclusive federal jurisdiction. A narrow view of the
appropriate scope of pendent jurisdiction in such cases, as in Hum itself,
leaves the plaintiff no choice but to incur the expense of separate state
and federal trials to vindicate his state and federal rights. It is no accident

that statutory treatment of the Hurn principle is contained in a subsection
of a statute conferring exclusive federal jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1338
(1958).
188. Where the scope of pendent jurisdiction is determined in a nonconstitutional context, such as in interpreting federal jurisdictional statutes

or the scope of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, considerations of trial
convenience may yield to countervailing considerations. See Note, 64

Hxv. L. REv. 968, 975-76 (1951). The existence of such countervailing
considerations, however, should not serve as a basis for limiting Congressional freedom to choose boundaries of pendent jurisdiction solely on criteria
of procedural convenience and desirable judicial administration.
189. Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U.S. 257 (1879).
190. See text accompanying notes 136-47 supra.

191. See note 29 supra.

192. See CLARK 434-35, 462-63.
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standard which may permit an appellate court to unscramble the
results of completed litigation because the higher court disagrees
with the lower court's application of that standard. If the conclusion reached earlier, that statutory pendent jurisdiction and section
1441(c) are fully correlative, 9' is sound, section 1441(c)
should operate in practice in much the same way. In the previous
section, it was argued that such an interpretation of section 1441
(c) in federal question cases avoids the line-drawing problems
which have plagued courts in applying section 1441 (c) to diversity
cases.' 94 In other words, section 1441(c) should invariably permit the removal of claims arising under federal law. Whether joined non-federal claims should be retained for a single federal trial
or remanded for separate state trial is left to the sound discretion
of the trial judge. Constitutional problems may be presented in
such cases where the trial judge retains the non-federal matters for
separate federal trial with no collateral procedural advantage to
having the separate trial in federal court.' 9 ' Whether or not this
is such an abuse of the discretion conferred upon the trial judge
by section 1441 (c) as to be reviewable on appeal,' 9' the mere
fact that the draftsmen have failed to circumscribe that discretion
by the use of a verbal standard should97 not provide a basis for
overturning the entire statutory structure.

193. See text accompanying notes 136-47 supra.
194. See notes 56-59, 69-70 supra.
195. See Finn v. American Fire & Cas. Co., 207 F.2d 113, 116 (5th Cir.
1953), cert. denied, 347 U..S 912 (1954). Cf. Breslerman v. American
Liberty Ins. Co., 169 F. Supp. 531, 534 (E.D.N.Y. 1959); Baltimore Gas
& Elec. Co. v. United States Fed. & Guar. Co., 159 F. Supp. 738, 741 (D.
Md. 1958).
196. There is no reason why constitutional infirmity should arise if Congress should make district court decisions in favor of jurisdiction immune
from appellate reversal. Compare the rule that federal jurisdiction cannot
be collaterally attacked. HART & WECSHLER 723-27. The discretion device can be treated as one which, at least for debatable decisions, accomplishes much the same purpose as immunization from appellate review.
See text accompanying note 142 supra.
197. A provision which specifically defined that "discretion" so as to require, in terms, remanding non-federal claims unless they were to be tried
in a single proceeding with the federal claims would have been unwise, at
least in multiple party cases. For example, there may be cases where establishing the liability of one defendant may turn upon establishing the liability of another defendant and then proving additional facts. There may
be no advantage, in terms of trying all issues in a single trial, in retaining
the claims against both defendants. But there may be an advantage in trying both claims before a single judge in a single court so that the second
defendant is bound by a determination of the first defendant's liability. Any
attempt to draft a single standard to determine the propriety of retaining
the joined non-removable claims runs the dangers of failing to appropriately take care of unanticipated situations and of increasing appellate reversal.
At least, the congressional choice of defining no verbal standard to limit
the district court's discretion should not raise constitutional problems.
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CONCLUSION

If the "separate and independent claim or cause of action" is
interpreted to begin where pendent jurisdiction ends, section 1441
(c) does not present the difficult line-drawing problem in federal
question cases which it poses in the diversity cases. In addition to
providing a more workable structure, section 1441(c) may also
present a more rational removal philosophy in single defendantsingle plaintiff federal question cases than in the multi-party diversity cases. Under the interpretation urged, section 1441(c) invariably provides for removal of federal claims asserted by plaintiff with discretion in the trial judge to determine whether to remand joined state claims for separate state trial. Viewing the trial
judge's discretion to remand non-federal matters in proper perspective, the constitutionality of section 144.1 (c) can be defended in
federal question cases upon a theory of pendent jurisdiction which
recognizes congressional power to extend jurisdictional boundaries
to encompass joined non-federal claims which can be conveniently
tried with federal claims. But despite its more rational and workable structure in federal question cases, and despite the fact that
constitutional objections should not prove insurmountable, there
is real reason to doubt the practical necessity, in such cases, of a
removal provision permitting removal broader than original jurisdiction.
CONCLUSION
Section 1441 (c) should be repealed, but not because its constitutionality is doubtful. Under existing joinder rules, it serves no
useful purpose in multi-party cases. In single plaintiff, single defendant cases, the few reported indicate that it is questionable
whether there is a practical need for a device to preclude destruction of the right to remove by joinder of unrelated causes. If such
a need does exist in these cases, it is more than outweighed by the
difficulties of construction and administration presented. The reduction of removal jurisdiction and simplicity of administration
sought by the Revisers of the Judicial Code in proposing section
1441 (c) would best have been obtained by limiting removal to
those cases within original federal jurisdiction.

